James Blair Historical Review
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 1

2014

James Blair Historical Review, Volume 5

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
(2014) "James Blair Historical Review, Volume 5," James Blair Historical Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1

This Journal is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted
for inclusion in James Blair Historical Review by an authorized editor of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014

1

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1

2

et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5

The James Blair
Historical Review
Editorial Board

Deborah Wood, Editor-in-Chief
Amy Schaffman, Managing Editor
Abby Gomulkiewicz, Submissions Editor
Matthew Paganussi, Publicity Manager

Peer Reviewers
Samra Asghedom
Jackie Borman
Genevieve Brei
Robin Crigler
Stephen D’Alessio
Jakob Deel

Whitney Fields Elizabeth Miserendino
Sara Garey-Sage
Samantha Payne
Noella Handley
Carol Peng
Lauren Jean
Margaret Strolle
Carter Lyon
Ricky Tischner
Kelly Manno
Amanda Williams

Faculty Advisors
Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura
Dr. Jeremy Pope

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014

3

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

Editor’s Note:
I am the James Blair Historical Review’s first Editor-inChief who was not involved with the journal from its inception. It
is an intimidating charge. In fact, last spring, I nearly did not apply to be the Editor-in-Chief of JBHR. Senior year was approaching,
and I meant to cut back on extra-curricular activities, not add them.
Suddenly running a journal with which I had not previously been
involved seemed like an especially big challenge, but I ultimately
chose to pursue the position of JBHR’s Editor-in-Chief because I
believe very strongly in its mission to encourage undergraduate research through publication. In pursuit of that mission, we have with
this published 21 such papers from William & Mary—and two more
from outside The College.
That’s right! I am not the only new element to JBHR: This
year, we extended the opportunity of submission to other Virginia
schools, and we were thrilled to receive papers written by students at
James Madison University, Hampton University, and Richard Bland
College, among others. Indeed, two of the following essays are written by students at Norfolk State University and the University of Virginia. I was particularly honored to interact with history departments
and authors across the state. I believe that expanding our audience in
Virginia will help foster a sense of a greater undergraduate historical
community, and I look forward to JBHR’s next steps in solidifying
its growth.
Of course, a significantly wider pool for submissions resulted in significantly more submissions this year than last. I want to
thank all of our authors, published or not, for trusting us with their
papers. Our indomitable peer reviewers have my gratitude for wading through all of them! I am indebted to our faculty advisors (Dr.
Hiroshima Kitamura and Dr. Jeremy Pope) and my fellow editors
(Amy Schaffman, Abby Gomulkiewicz, and Matthew Paganussi).
On behalf of the entire 2013-2014 Editorial Board, we thank
you for picking up a copy of the James Blair Historical Review. It
has been very thoughtfully crafted for your enjoyment and edification.
				
Sincerely,
				
Deborah Wood
				Editor-in-Chief
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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The Passing of the Carthaginian Peace:

Keynes, Britain, and the Reparations Question, 1918-1920
Jake Douglas, The College of William & Mary
“No! The economist is not king; quite true. But he ought to be!
He is a better and wiser governor than the general or the diplomatist or the oratorical governor.”
—J.M. Keynes, article in the Manchester Guardian
Commercial, 19221
Introduction
Rarely has an economist enjoyed such influence in his own
lifetime as John Maynard Keynes. No one disputes that designation.
Yet one man in his time plays many parts. Keynes served His Majesty’s Government in both World Wars and attended the 1919 Paris
Peace Conference as a member of the British Delegation. A strident
critic of the Treaty of Versailles he failed to avert, Keynes was a
prolific writer during the interwar period, authoring several books
and dozens of articles and editorials. He has been rightly called, in
the words of his mentee Austin Robinson, an economist, an author,
and a statesman.2
For interwar Europe, Keynes was most influential as a public
propagandist. A self-ascribed evangelist for liberal internationalism,
he even titled one collection of his own writings “Essays in Persuasion.”3 In Paris, Keynes resigned from the British delegation in a fit
of humiliation and rage, convinced the victors were imposing a “Carthaginian peace” on defeated Germany and Austria.4 The economic
and reparations clauses of the Treaty were so onerous, he believed,
that their realization was simultaneously impossible and ruinous
for European economic vitality. The dictates of Britain and France
would only succeed in starving the German people and exposing all
of Europe to the specter of Bolshevism. If the Germans were to pay
this tax at all, it would be in blood.
Keynes broadcasted his plea for revision of the Treaty in The
Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in Britain on December 12, 1919. The book delivered a unifying ideology for those
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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beginning to doubt the settlement’s prudence and morality. The readership was vast, and its influence is obvious from the correspondence
of British statesmen. In taking the first steps towards appeasement,
“perhaps,” wrote A.J.P. Taylor, “they were influenced by the writings of Keynes.”5 Indeed, the economist’s strictures weighed heavily
upon the post-Versailles conferences of 1920.
Keynes was not solely responsible for shifting British policy
towards revision in the early 1920s. Nevertheless, John Maynard
Keynes was instrumental in accelerating the transformation of British policy from penalty to leniency, and he uniquely contributed to
the passing, as it were, of a Carthaginian peace. “It would doubtless
be a profitable task,” in the words of a famous critic, “to inquire into
the Historical Causes of Mr. Keynes.”6
Pre-Armistice Agreement
Fighting on the Western front officially ended on November
11, 1918, with the signing of the Armistice agreement between Germany and the Allies. Exhausted and demoralized, the German war
effort was on the brink of collapse. Yet the Reich was not vanquished
decisively on the battlefield; there was no unconditional surrender.
The Armistice was a conditional agreement between legally equal
parties. It was a situation that conferred Germany some assurances
and guarantees.
The ceasefire was predicated upon the fulfillment of principles found in President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and associated speeches. The German Note of October 5, 1918, accepted the
legitimacy of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and requested an armistice.
Following a series of communications between German and Allied
Governments, Wilson transmitted his own Note back on November
5, 1918. He confirmed all parties had declared their willingness to
end the war “on the terms of peace laid down in the President’s Address to Congress of January 8, 1918 [the Fourteen Points], and the
principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.”7
The Allies’ sole caveat was that Germany be held accountable for
“all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their
property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the
air.”8 The “limiting quality” of these terms is further corroborated
by the text of later addresses. In his speech to Congress on February
11, 1918, Wilson vowed the European peace would include neither
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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“contributions” nor “punitive damages.”9
These were the conditions on which Great Britain could legally demand payment from Germany at the Paris Peace Conference.
Because of its peculiar role in the war as an “offshore balancer,”
Britain had suffered little civilian damage relative to France and Belgium. A strict interpretation of the terms listed above meant, therefore, that Britain could only claim damages to “civilian life and property” due to “air raids, naval bombardments, submarine warfare, and
mines,” as well as “compensation for improper treatment of interned
civilians.”10 The direct expenses of warfighting, as well as indirect
damages such as lost trade incurred during the war, were on Britain’s
tab.11
At first glance, “damage to the civilian population” seems an
innocuous phrase—secure from any ambiguity that might allow the
Allies to demand larger indemnities. Yet almost immediately, long
dormant political tides demanding punishment for Germany swept
across Great Britain. Soon the work of “the sophists and the lawyers… discover[ed] in the written word what was not there,” and the
claims of British politicians came to cover nearly the entire cost of
the war.12
Election of 1918
A general election was announced for early December three
days after the Armistice.13 It was the first held in Britain since 1910.
The election quickly morphed into a bedlam of acrimony as “antiGermanism became the fever of the moment.”14 Albeit less so than
Belgium or France, Britain had suffered terribly in the Great War.
Millions of casualties were no easy burden. The crushing weight of
war debt had continually strained public finance. A painful task of
reconstruction lay ahead. As Winston Churchill observed with haunting expression,
The brave people whom nothing had daunted had suffered too much. Their unpent feelings were lashed by
the popular press into fury. The crippled and mutilated
soldiers darkened the streets. The returned prisoners told
the hard tale of bonds and privation. Every cottage had
its empty chair. Hatred of the beaten foe, thirst for his
punishment, rushed up from the hearts of deeply injured
millions.15
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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The oft-cited poetry of Rudyard Kipling, who lost a son to German
artillery, was prescient in 1917 of the fierce vindictiveness to come:
“We have only the memory left of [our children’s] home-treasured
sayings and laughter / The price of our loss shall be paid to our hands,
not another’s hereafter.”16
Across the country, demagogues mounted campaign stages
spouting fire and brimstone. The Conservatives—coalition partners
of Prime Minister Lloyd George’s Liberal party—smelled blood and
forced Liberal and Labour party candidates alike towards more punitive campaign slogans like “Hang the Kaiser” and “Make Germany
Pay.”17 Financier and journalist Horatio Bottomley advised Britons
that “if by chance you should discover one day in a restaurant that
you are being served by a German waiter, you will throw the soup in
his foul face; if you find yourself sitting at the side of a German clerk,
you will spill the inkpot over his vile head.”18 Bottomley sailed into
office as an MP that year with eighty percent of the vote.19
Those who opposed harsh terms for Germany were not so
successful. Herbert Henry Asquith, leader of the Liberal party since
1908, did not want Germany destroyed. In the year preceding the
election, Asquith argued for a “Clean Peace,” reasoning that heavy
reparations would constitute “a ‘veiled war’ continu[ed] ‘by other
methods.’”20 A local Conservative candidate ousted Asquith from the
East Fife seat he had occupied since 1886.21 He did not return to
Parliament until 1920.
The Prime Minister himself was no “high reparationer.” At
a meeting of Liberal MPs on November 12, 1918, he swore that an
oppressive peace would inspire German revanchism, drawing a parallel to the harsh penalty forced on France in 1871.22 He believed the
Great War began fundamentally as a result of miscommunication and
had wrecked what had historically been neutral Anglo-German relations.23 Lloyd George maintained in his memoirs that
So far as my own view is concerned, it is on record that
I never thought Germany could pay these huge sums.
Speaking at Bristol on December 11th, 1918, in the course
of the election campaign, I said: ‘If I were to say to you,
not merely that Germany ought to pay, but that we can
expect every penny, I should be doing so without giving
you the whole of the facts…’24

His caution notwithstanding, the Prime Minister’s slogans soon inhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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cluded “Make Germany Pay.”25 Lloyd George rode the wave of antiGerman zeal, and as Bernard Baruch observed, “the English people,
by an overwhelming majority, return[ed] to power their Prime Minister on the basis of an increase in the severity of these terms of
the peace, especially those of reparation.”26 The stage was set for a
vindictive peace.
Keynes and the Conference
The wrath of British public opinion had not subsided by the
time of the Allies met in Versailles. Even if they did not personally
support punishing Germany, British, French, and Belgian delegates
alike felt constrained by their domestic political conditions. The conference was in essence an act in defining for whom the peace was to
be just. As American delegate Bernard Baruch conjectured,
If the ideal peace…had been actually undertaken, with all
that it seemingly involved of sacrifice and unselfishness,
the result would have been the overthrow of at least three
of the major governments. It would have been followed
further by the substitution of other representatives who
would have come into power under a popular mandate requiring them to be even more exacting in their terms.27

As head of a minority party in a coalition government with the Conservatives, David Lloyd George depended on support from across
the British political spectrum. The need for political subservience
moderated whatever hopes he held for a temperate peace. In late
March and early April, the British press and the House of Commons
challenged his claim to leadership. Standing in for the Prime Minister, MP Bonar Law was roundly attacked in an indemnity debate
with the Conservative rank-and-file, or backbenchers.28 On April 8,
three hundred members of the House of Commons dispatched a telegram to Lloyd George demanding the fulfillment of his campaign
pledges.29 So blunt was this act that George felt compelled to return
to London and address Parliament, reassuring his countrymen that he
““want[ed] a stern peace, because the occasion demands it. The crime
demands it.’”30 Given these external constraints, the Prime Minister
determined to set upon the most politically acceptable path: Britain
must squeeze every penny out of German coffers and industry.31
The Prime Minister surrounded himself with three men who
shared the rancorous expectations of their national publics. Prime
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014

13

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

14

James Blair Historical Review

Spring 2014

Minister of the Australian Commonwealth William Morris Hughes
made a habit of demagoguery while in Paris.32 At one point, he “insisted that every Australian who had placed a mortgage on his house
to buy a war bond was as definitely entitled to reparation as was
every Frenchman whose house had been burned by the Germans.”33
Even before its signing, Hughes had publicly refused to accept the
narrow terms of the Pre-Armistice agreement.34 Lord Sumner of Ibstone John Andrew Hamilton had been a lord of appeal in ordinary
and a famous lawyer. When cautioned by the Prime Minister “that
too much severity might push Germany into Bolshevism, he replied,
… ‘In that case the Germans will be cutting each others’ throats, and
there is nothing I would like better.’”35 Together with Lord Cunliffe,
an ex-governor of the Bank of England, these three “high reparationers” represented Britain’s most parochial interests.36
Keynes detested these men, especially the Lords Sumner
and Cunliffe. As McGill Professor John A. Hall writes, “in Keynes’s
demonology of the Conference, Sumner stood, like Lucifer, at the
apex, worse even than his satellite Cunliffe. Cunliffe was troublesome because he plucked figures from the sky and threw his considerable weight behind them.”37 The “astronomical” reparations figures
the two devised led Keynes to style them the “Heavenly Twins.”38
Keynes again described them in nightmarish terms in one of his notebooks: “A remarkable couple protected British interests, the Lords
Sumner and Cunliffe—as though—it seemed to onlookers—a vulture were bedfellow with a pig, the one tearing the flesh from the
dying victim but it was the other who was gorged.”39
In Keynes’s estimation, the Lords had no expertise in international affairs. They were above all campaign advisors. Lloyd
George, Keynes observed to Sir Bradbury, frequently asked him and
the Twins to prepare the same memoranda separately. Keynes’s advice was of economic and practical relevance; theirs was political.
The Prime Minister might then strive for a “middle course.”40 As he
wrote to Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain about the
Lords after the Conference,
The Prime Minister was never under the slightest illusion as to the value of their advice. They were, as he well
knew, the price he had to pay for electioneering. If I were
to give the whole story of his relations with those two as I
know it as first hand, I do not think the world would hold
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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him excused.41

Guided by the Twins, not Keynes, the Prime Minister finally committed to one of the broadest construction of “damage done to the
civilian population” imaginable; he claimed that Germany was liable for all British servicemen’s disability and death pensions.42 As
Sumner argued, a soldier is “‘simply a civilian called to arms in the
cause of justice; his uniform makes no difference.’”43 They reasoned
it was unjust “that Germany was to pay compensation for a broken
chimney-pot on a French cottage, but not for the dependents of a
British soldier killed defending it.”44 The ulterior motive was to enlarge the slice of the pie that Britain was entitled to as a contributor in
the war of troops but not occupied territory. In desperation to fix an
agreement, President Wilson acceded to Lloyd George’s unyielding
demand on April 1.
Keynes was devastated. The terms to be imposed on Germany were not only prohibitive but also in violation to Britain’s previous engagements. In writing to his mother, Keynes expressed a deep
sense of personal failure.45 On May 26, he wrote to Chamberlain
about his justifications for leaving:
We have presented a draft treaty to the Germans which
contains much that is unjust and much more that is inexpedient…If this policy is pursued, the consequences
will be disastrous in the extreme…I cannot express how
strongly I feel as to the gravity of what is in front of us,
and I must have my hands quite free….The Prime Minister is leading us all into a morass of destruction…How
can you expect me to assist at this tragic farce any longer,
seeking to lay the foundations, as a Frenchman puts it,
‘d’une guerre juste et durable’?46

The British Government, now hostile to a real peace, had no place
for Keynes. On June 5, Keynes tendered a letter of resignation to
Lloyd George, “leav[ing] the twins to gloat over the devastation of
Europe and to assess to taste what remains for the British taxpayer.”47
Europe after the Treaty
Keynes departed Paris in June 1919 in a state of vexation.
Many in Parliament and the British delegation shared this lack of
sentimentality for the Conference. But for much of the remaining
year as Keynes began writing his critique, optimism for the Treaty as
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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a whole was politically ascendant in Britain. By late fall, however,
reports of the Continent’s deteriorating economic and political conditions began to chip away at expectations that the Treaty could, after
all, be moderately easy to fulfill.
On July 21, Mr. Thomas Shaw, an MP from Preston and a
junior whip for the Labour party, addressed the House of Commons
as it was debating the adoption of the Treaty. While still affirming his
overall support, he questioned some of its provisions in relation to
the Pre-Armistice Agreement:
The Armistice was definitely arranged…on the Fourteen
Points…Is there a right hon. or hon. Gentleman here who
will claim that the annexation for fifteen years of the Saar
Valley is not a distinct violation of the terms upon which
the Armistice was signed? If that be the fact, in what respect are we better than the Germans were when they tore
up the scrap of paper [Belgian neutrality]?48

His probe outraged another MP Mr. J. Jones who interrupted ad hominem, “We are not to be insulted by members from Jerusalem! Are
we to stand insults from a Jew?”49 Shaw was not Jewish, but the use
of anti-Semitic attacks shows the antipathy with which revision was
still regarded. Also in the Commons that July, Lloyd George affirmed
the justice of the Treaty despite his constant personal reservations.
He maintained, “if the whole cost of the war, all the costs incurred
by every country that has been forced into war by the action of Germany, had been thrown upon Germany, it would have been in accord
with every principle of civilized jurisprudence in the world.”50 Britain’s war fever was still running high.
Meanwhile, Keynes had begun what was to become his seminal work. General Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and
Keynes’s closest ally in Paris, was the original inspiration. While
leaving the conference, Smuts urged Keynes to write an economic
critique of the Treaty’s provisions. It would be for mass consumption, “not be too long or technical, as we may want to appeal to
the plain man more than to the well informed or the specialist.”51
Keynes’s target audience had become the general public. In the light
Paris had shown on the nature of populist politics, he saw that “it was
very doubtful how far the various governments concerned would be
prepared to act unless they were stimulated by outside action.”52
General Smuts soon had second thoughts about the essay,
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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but Keynes was not so easily deterred.53 His spirits rose with encouragement from other members of the British political elite. On July
17, Keynes wrote to Lord Robert Cecil, chairman of the Supreme
Economic Council:
After some weeks of rest and reflection, I find I take a not
less pessimistic view as to the prospects of Europe and of
European order, unless early steps are taken to make and
admit as a dead letter many of the economic clauses of the
treaty. Do you agree? Has not the time come for explaining a little what a damnable and disastrous document the
treaty is?54

An admirer of Keynes, Cecil responded that “all [he said] shall be
most carefully considered” by the Council, but in the interim, Keynes
should write “a brilliant article…exposing from a strictly economic
point of view the dangers of the treaty.”55 Keynes devoted himself to
this task until early December.
That summer, elation over the conclusion of the Treaty still
gripped many members of Parliament with romanticism. Mr. Adamson, MP from Fife Western, spoke before the Commons about
an “ideal” “spirit of reconciliation.”56 In Adamson’s calculation, not
only could the harsh terms of the Treaty be fulfilled, but also Germany could welcome them with open arms—Britain and Germany
together sweeping away all national animosities from the littered
battlefields of Europe. The foundations of this fanciful thinking began to crack as the year wore on.
By November, the British Parliament became aware that
Central Europe—in particular Austria but also Germany—had fallen
into near total economic dislocation. On October 30, the Prime Minister stated in the Commons that “Germany this year is broken. Her
people are enfeebled and her production has fallen 40 per cent.”57
Bonar Law, leader of the Coalition Conservatives, conceded the
point but maintained he had no doubts a reasonable sum could be
extracted from Germany in the near future.58 On November 20, Lord
Cecil urged the Prime Minister to consider what impact further degradation in Austria and Central Europe might have on the European
security.59 By December 4, MP Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck admonished the Prime Minister that,
In order to prevent a further collapse of economic life in
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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Central Europe, he would use his influence to have either
the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or
both, summoned, in order that the League might itself initiate measures for international credit, or any other measures of international co-operation necessary to prevent a
further international economic breakdown…60

Slowly awakening to the hopelessness of the terms of Versailles being satisfied in the near term, Britain was ready for a framework to
help it understand the complexities of the economic problems facing
Europe. That framework, a liberal internationalist apology for revision, appeared between the pages of Keynes’s book.
Economic Consequences of the Peace
Keynes’s treatise begins with a challenge to its English
reader: “the British people received the Treaty without reading it.”61
The leaders of Europe, he argued, had deceived by their peoples into
believing in the dictates of an impossible Treaty. His purpose, he
continued, was “to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not practically right or possible.”62 Keynes thrusts a hard truth onto his readers,
something that by the start of 1920 they already knew with frightening certitude: “In continental Europe the earth heaves and no one but
is aware of the rumblings. There it is…a matter of…life and death,
of starvation and existence, and of the fearful convulsions of a dying civilization.”63 Central Europe was in its death throes, no doubt,
but the war was not alone responsible for its poor lot. No, since the
war, the allies had “abus[ed] their momentary victorious power to
destroy” their erstwhile adversaries.64 Indeed,
So far as possible…it was the policy of France to set the
clock back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress
of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and
other measures, her population was to be curtailed; but
chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended
for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal,
and transport must be destroyed.65

This scheme of national vengefulness had been obscured from public
view because it was “clothed, for [President Wilson’s] sake, in the
august language of freedom and international equality.”66 Lip service
was paid to Wilsonian ideals, but “it would be stupid to believe that
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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there is much room in the world, as it really is, for such affairs as the
League of Nations, or any sense in the principle of self-determination except as an ingenuous formula for rearranging the balance of
power in one’s own interests.”67
The economic and reparations clauses of the Treaty, wrote
Keynes, “are comprehensive, and little has been overlooked which
might impoverish Germany now or obstruct her development in the
future.”68 Before the war, German vitality was essential for the economic health of Central (as well as Western and Northern) Europe.
Now the allies aimed at the “systematic destruction” of the German
industrial giant.69 Under the Treaty, Germany ceded to the Allies all
of her merchant marine vessels, all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions, all public and private property in Alsace-Lorraine,
the coal-mines of the Saar Basin and Upper Silesia, and most of her
rolling stock.70 Out of what little resources remained, Germany was
obliged to replace yearly the losses France and Belgium sustained in
coal production as a consequence of the war.71 These charges were
demanded outright; their forfeiture would in no way reduce the total
indemnity eventually demanded of Germany. “Thus,” said Keynes,
“Germany’s influence is eliminated and her capital confiscated in all
those neighboring countries to which she might naturally look for
her future livelihood, and for an outlet for her energy, enterprise,
and technical skill.”72 This burden was further imposed by a clause
guaranteeing the Reparation Commission “dictatorial powers over
all Germany property of every description whatever.”73
Using inferential logic and pre-war statistical data, Keynes
calculated both the maximum indemnity for which Germany was liable based on the Pre-Armistice Agreement and the maximum she
was capable of paying over thirty years: £10,000 million and £2,000
million, respectively. A major component of the latter figure, as well,
would have to be realized by the material transfers listed above.
Since “Germany’s capacity to pay will be exhausted by the direct
and legitimate claims which the allies hold against her, the question
of her contingent liability…becomes academic. Prudent and honorable statesmanship would therefore have given her the benefit of the
doubt.”74
The Treaty did not enumerate a specific, fixed indemnity.
However, Keynes reasoned from the text of the economic and reparations clauses that the Allies could now demand at least £40,000
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million, an order of magnitude higher than what Germany could ever
feasibly pay. Moreover, the lack of a fixed indemnity meant that the
figure could be revised upwards periodically as the German economy recovered, locking Germany into the Allies’ permanent debt.
Thus were the terms of the Treaty a practical impossibility.
Germany could not pay the astronomical sums demanded by the Allies. Britain and France would never be compensated—all the more
so if they destroyed the machine tasked to remunerate them by their
severity of their demands. As President Wilson asserted to Lloyd
George in 1919,
You have suggested that we all address ourselves to the
problem of helping to put Germany on her feet, but how
can your experts or ours be expected to work out a new
plan to furnish working capital to Germany when we deliberately start out by taking away all Germany’s present
capital? How can anyone expect America to turn over to
Germany in any considerable measure new working capital to take the place of that which the European nations
have determined to take from her?75

If this “European Civil War” was continued by economic means,
Keynes prophesied, the victors would “invite their own destruction
also, being so deeply and inextricably intertwined with their victims
by hidden psychic and economic bonds.”76 Economic depression
threatened Bolshevism, militarism, or anarchy in Central Europe.
These movements could not leave Western Europe unscathed. “How
greatly,” resolves Keynes, “if it is to understand its destiny, the world
needs light.”77
Reception in Britain
The Economic Consequences of the Peace became a classic
of the English language virtually overnight.78 It made publishing history in 1920, selling more than 60,000 copies in the United States and
Britain in the first two months. The Labour Party sold tens of thousands of a special cheap edition for a fourth the cost.79 Keynes sent
73 advance copies to a group that included H.H. Asquith, Bonar Law,
Austen Chamberlain, General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil, Reginald
McKenna, Winston Churchill, Lord Beaverbrook, Edwin Montagu,
A.J. Balfour, Sir John Bradbury, and Sir Robert Chalmers.80 The publishing of his book was, in Keynes’s own account, “followed by conhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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gratulations from half the Cabinet, and invitations from three parties
to stand for Parliament!”81 In the following months, The Economic
Consequences of the Peace was reviewed by hundreds of journals
and translated into dozens of languages.82 As late as August 1920,
Keynes’s book was still selling at a rate of 200 copies per week, even
excluding the cheap Labour edition.83 By 1924, “‘it had been read,’
in the opinion of Sir William Beveridge, ‘by—at a moderate computation—half a million people who never read an economic work
before and probably will not read one again’.”84
By this time, Keynes held the stature of an ultimate “authority” or “expert” in Britain—an impartial demigod in all matters
economic. The British weekly political and literary review Time and
Tide published a personality sketch of Keynes in July 1921: “Persons
of all parties and nationalities seek out and consult him; he is accessible, quite without any sort of personal arrogance, and endowed, in
a high degree, with the power of making half an hour’s conversation
an event that lives in the memory and feeds the mind.”85 A December
2, 1920, article in the Manchester Guardian introduced Keynes as
“the most distinguished British authority on the whole question of
‘reparation’.”86
Keynes received one of his first responses on December 22,
1919, from Austen Chamberlain. The Chancellor expressed some regret that “a late public servant” would risk damaging his country’s
image abroad with irreverent rhetoric. Yet, continued Chamberlain,
“I wish I thought your reasoning as to Germany’s capacity to pay,
and your picture of the economic state of Europe, less accurate than I
do. I think you a little too pessimistic, but in the main I believe you to
be right.”87 Chamberlain’s response is typical for British politicians
and journalists already doubtful of the practicability of the Treaty.
On January 14, 1920, a poem titled “The Candour of Keynes” was
printed in Punch magazine:
There was a superior young person named KEYNES
Who possessed an extensive equipment of brains…
So, after five months of progressive disgust,
He shook from his feet the Parisian dust,…
And his arguments cannot be lightly dismissed
With cries of ‘Pro-Hun’ or of ‘Pacifist’…
Still we feel, as he zealously damns the Allies
For grudging the Germans the means to arise
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That possibly some of the Ultimate Things
May even be hidden from Fellows of King’s.

Acceptance of Keynes economic strictures and hesitation for his
political ones: these were the key twin features for most responses.
This led Keynes, time and time again in personal correspondence,
authored articles, and discussions with MPs, to state that no one seriously challenged his claims any longer.88
In a letter to The Times titled “Mr. Keynes’s Demand for
Revisions,” Keynes received his first “serious and responsible criticism” from John Foster Dulles, former legal adviser to the American
financial delegation in Paris. As Keynes observed in a reply to The
Times, Dulles did not dispute his £2,000 million figure for Germany’s
capacity to pay.89 They agreed on the economic fundamentals. What
Dulles did contest was Keynes’s censure of the Reparation Commission’s “dictatorial powers.” For Dulles, the commission’s freedom
opened an avenue for
An intelligent alleviation of terms and modes of payment
in the event that they prove to be excessive; the whole
operation to be akin to that of a settlement in which the
creditors recognize that their own interest lies in preserving and enhancing the economic vitality of their debtor.90

Writing in his memoirs years later, David Lloyd George came to a
very similar conclusion.91 Bernard Baruch held that “steps are provided in the elastic mechanism for the Reparation Commission which
will enable us, in the calmer days to come, to climb nearer perfection.”92 Keynes, however, believed that only formal treaty revision
would relieve European relations of the friction of the reparations
debate.93 “Until the treaty is formally revised,” Keynes averred, “it
is wiser and safer to take seriously some even of [the Treaty’s] more
extravagant clauses.”94
The impact of Keynesianism was felt throughout the British government. Mr. H. D. Beaumont, British Commissioner on
the Interallied Commission for the Administration and Plebiscite in
Marienwerder (East Prussia), wrote to Foreign Secretary Earl Curzon in February 1920 that “the difficulties foreseen by J. M. Keynes
(‘Economic Consequences of the Peace’) are more real than when
he wrote in October last and his pessimism is only too clearly justified.”95 Keynes’s book was not the only source of information driving
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doubts about the Treaty, but it provided an ideology that made sense
of the facts on the ground. Also in February, acting Chargé d’affaires
at Washington Mr. R. C. Lindsay stressed to Curzon Keynes’s diplomatic impact in America: “from the point of view of Anglo-American relations, I would think it wise for His Majesty’s Government to
follow a [conciliatory] course in the matter of reparation.”96
The Economic Consequences of the Peace featured prominently in a House of Commons debate over the peace settlement on
February 12, 1920. Sir William Mitchell-Thomson began by roundly
denouncing Keynes, arguing much like Chamberlain that he had
damaged the Allies’ negotiating position abroad. He maintained that
if treaty revision ultimately proved necessary, the Reparations Commission, not the advocacy of Mr. Keynes, should conduct it. He did
not seriously critique Keynes’s economics, however, stating that “he
may be right, he may be wrong, but who can say?”97 Bonar Law defended Keynes to a point, arguing that
Anyone who has read his book or listened to his argument
would feel that judging by the experience of the world in
the past it is very difficult to see how the Germans can
pay outside their own country even the sum which I think
they ought to be made to pay. That is true, but things do
not turn out in this world precisely as you expect them to
turn out.98

Law defended his own political behavior and that of the House during the Paris Peace Conference, asking “what human being could
have put… any figure which by any possibility could have been regarded as one that under all the circumstances would be fair and
reasonable? It was not possible.”99 Applying the same coping mechanism as Mitchell-Thompson, Law opened the possibility of treaty
revision while protecting his self-image and reputation.
A.J. Balfour denounced Keynes as a German apologist and
dismissed his £2,000 million figure for Germany’s capacity to pay
altogether, holding that “Germany herself… plac[es] her maximum
possible contribution at two and a half times… above that which
Mr. Keynes fixed.”100 Keynes contacted Balfour personally, directing him to a passage in The Economic Consequences of the Peace
demonstrating that when correcting for technicalities, the German
offer of £5,000 million actually only amounted to £1,500 million.
Balfour renounced his allegation publically in a letter to The Times
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on February 24.101 Perhaps this had some effect on his anti-Keynesite
campaign.
Nearly all contemporaries wrote that Keynes’s book had effected a massive shift in British public opinion away from harsh reparations almost immediately. On New Year’s Eve 1919, Lord Robert
Cecil congratulated Keynes on his triumph, claiming that it “ ha[d]
produced and will produce great and increasing changes in public
opinion.”102 On March 20, 1920, Basil Blackett, a British Treasury
official, wrote to Keynes, “Your book has undoubtedly borne some
fruit, and though as you know I am not a whole-hearted admirer of
it, I readily give you the credit for much of the advance in British
and other public opinion.”103 Britain was becoming less unforgiving. This transformation would allow politicians like David Lloyd
George to begin the task of revision, gradual and de facto if not de
jure as Keynes preferred.
Post-Paris Conferences of 1920
“‘Hope,’” wrote French critic Étienne Mantoux, “‘hope’
was what Mr. Keynes was offering in 1919.” Indeed, notes Professor
Richard Grayson, “The Economic Consequences of the Peace…provided the intellectual foundation of Liberal proposals for revising the
economic settlement of Europe in the 1920s.”104 In 1920, that project
was admittedly modest. Nonetheless, Liberal politicians made small,
definite gains at post-Versailles international conferences in 1920.
H.H. Asquith, leader of the Liberal party, returned to Parliament in the 1920 Paisley by-election. Sensing a shift in public
opinion, Asquith and other Liberals began demanding that the reparations bill be fixed and lowered immediately.105 He never said so in
public, but Asquith’s quick adoption of the figure £2,000 million for
Germany’s capacity to pay could have come from only one source—
The Economic Consequences of the Peace. MP Mitchell-Thomson,
at the February 12th debate in the House of Commons, felt “bound
to say I have a strong suspicion that, although the voice was the
voice of Paisley, the inspiration really comes from somewhere very
close to King’s College, Cambridge.”106
Perhaps inspired by Asquith’s reelection, the Prime Minister
began snaking his way back to a moderate position on reparations.
Keynes observed him closely:
The deeper and the fouler the bogs into which Mr. Lloyd
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George leads us, the more credit is his for getting us out.
He leads us in to satisfy our desires; he leads us out to
save our souls. He hands us down the primrose path and
puts out the bonfire just in time. Who, ever before, enjoyed the best of heaven and hell as we do?107

Through the entire period, Keynes’s opinion of George was deeply
torn. He vacillated between spitting ethnic epithets about leprechauns
(Lloyd George was Welsh) to praising his ingenious knack for politicking. In 1920, the latter sentiment won out as the Prime Minister
carefully obviated the worst features of the Treaty’s economic and
reparations clauses.
The European powers held six conferences in 1920. At San
Remo from April 19 to 26, Lloyd George was forced to pledge to
maintain the overall integrity of the Treaty to French Premier Millerand. Yet he succeeded in convincing the French to allow a German party to attend the Spa conference that summer. In his speech
to the House of Commons upon his return, the Prime Minister announced his intention for a loose interpretation.108 A fixed indemnity
was tentatively selected at Boulogne on June 21 and 22. The total,
269,000,000,000 gold marks, fell to 226,000,000,000 at the Paris
conference at the beginning of 1921.109 At Spa on July 5-16, 1920,
British, French, and German delegates conducted negotiations faceto-face and settled on a schedule of payments for coal deliveries.110
1920’s last conference, December 16-22 in Brussels, was also its
most significant. Germany, Britain, and France agreed upon leniency
in payment until 1923; payment in material deliveries not cash; a
limitation on total expenses that could be charged for the Allied occupation armies in the Rhineland; and a waiver for Allied claims to
demand free German shipbuilding.111
Beset by Anglo-French friction over the severity of the terms
of the Treaty, the atmosphere of each conference was usually hostile.
Yet, Keynes grasped,
The total effect was cumulative; and by gradual stages the
project of revising the Treaty gained ground in every quarter. The Conferences furnish an extraordinary example of
Mr. Lloyd George’s methods. At each of them he pushed
the French as far as he could, but not as far as he wanted;
and then came home to acclaim the settlement provisionally reached (and destined to be changed a month later)
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as an expression of complete accord between himself and
his French colleague…he steadily gained his object.112

These tactics won the Prime Minister no friends in France. Neither,
though, did the shadow of Keynes. “Pertinax,” anonymous editor of
the Paris Echo, wrote in July 1920 on the Spa Agreement that “unexpectedly between the covers of a book appears the great opponent
whose strength Millerand must overcome…The ideas set forth in
this volume are permeating the whole atmosphere of the Spa Conference.”113 In an August letter to The Times, French economist Henri
Brenier grumbled that “British opinion has been so poisoned by Mr
Keynes’s paradoxes and fallacies—(which, we sincerely hope, will
be exploded some time by indisputable figures), that it is really necessary to insist with some detail on Germany’s ‘coal-capacity’ to
pay at least.”114 Whether through his direct economic counsel or the
freedom from fear of political repercussion that his advocacy had
extended to treaty revisionists, every conference felt Keynes’s presence. Notwithstanding that Keynes played no role in the Spa Coal
Agreement, T.E. Lawrence sent him a note upon its resolution saying, simply, “In the Times today—magnificent! Do keep it up.”115
Conclusion
History remembers John Maynard Keynes principally as an
economist, sometimes as a statesman. Seldom do we think of him
as the marketer of an ideology. Yet it is obvious from the historical record that this profession consumed most of his time and all
of his passions for years after the war. The image of a man pulling at the heartstrings of a desperate public is not unusual for the
time period. Hence the question of how much one person can mold
the worldviews of whole countries bears real weight. The impact of
Keynes and The Economic Consequences of the Peace in the early
days of interwar Britain was substantial. Certainly his efforts constituted some of the first steps towards appeasement. It is difficult to
know whether Britain would have settled its reparations question in
a Keynes-less vacuum. This is always true with history, but maybe
it is all the more so because it is simply impossible to conceive of a
post-war Britain without John Maynard Keynes.
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Solidarity in Slavery:

Examining Urban Slavery in Brazil
Rachel Azfrani, The College of William & Mary
The African slave trade drove the Brazilian economy in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, permanently impacting the
demographic and cultural composition of the area. The millions of
slaves that arrived in Brazil encountered a series of different fates,
largely determined by where they landed and the work they performed. While the majority of slaves were sent to work on rural
plantations, the quickly developing urban areas of Brazil attracted
a growing market for the slave trade. As the population of Africans
came to outnumber the Portuguese population, the struggle to adapt
a social hierarchy ensued in urban regions. Attempting to create a
social network while shaping autonomy generated fierce competition between slaves. The social, religious, and economic activities
of urban Brazil influenced the ethnic solidarity of African slaves in
their occupational lives and in their social interactions both within
the enslaved community and with the Portuguese population. Ultimately, the tensions provoked by these conditions prevented fluid
ethnic solidarity in Brazilian society.
The variety of different positions for slaves in urban society contributed to the diverse experiences of African slaves. Slaves
looking to gain opportunities for camaraderie as well as personal advantages in the urban setting created a startling ethnic discord. Each
slave brought his or her tribal origins to Brazil, where the various African identities immediately clashed and remained divided. Provided
the opportunity to marry, slaves most often married within their ethnic group in an effort to maintain their cultural heritage.1 Even while
waiting to be sold, the slaves’ actions in urban slave markets show
their mutual fear of each other’s foreignness. In her Journal of a voyage to Brazil, Maria Calcott of Britain describes the anxiety of newly
purchased slaves and their “listlessness of despair…[The patriots]
have put arms into the hands of new negroes, while the recollection
of their own country, and of the slave-ship, and of the slave-market,
is fresh in their memory.”2 Many tribal groups were traditionally disposed to conflict, and this led to frequent brawls in the city streets
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that housed slave markets. These bursts of violence created significant tension in Brazilian urban society, especially during the Latin
American independence movements when Calcott wrote her travelogue. As slaves integrated into colonial society, they adapted their
cultural identities and hostilities with them.
Occupations further stratified the social hierarchy of slaves
in urban Brazil. The most underprivileged groups were primarily
united by their loathing for the relatively privileged domestic slaves.
Urban domestic slaves, especially those belonging to the elite, received certain benefits that placed them on a higher social rung than
other urban slaves. Domestic slaves were sometimes able to escort
their masters on outings, given a stipend, or given fine clothing in
order to reflect the status of their master.3 When a slave had a close
relationship with his master, he increased his chances of manumission—that is, of being released from slavery—and this exacerbated
strained relations with other slaves. Calcott observed that relationships between masters and slaves “diminish the evils of slavery to
one, the tyranny of Mastery to the other.”4 As historian Zephyr Frank
has outlined, certain jobs possessed certain racial associations, and
“it meant that in the lower and middle sectors of society there was
a great deal of crosscutting of social categories: higher-status work
accorded a ‘lighter’ racial characterization; the work associated with
slaves carried a ‘darker’ classification.”5 Domestic slavery, although
strenuous, was looked upon by other urban slaves as one of the most
esteemed lines of work. Furthermore, the opportunity for domestic
slaves to attend church with their masters provided a social similarity
to the Portuguese elite. Calcott’s journals suggest that religion was a
common ground between slaves and the Portuguese, and “everything
that [united] men in one common sentiment [was] interesting. The
church doors were open, the altars illuminated, and the very slave
felt that he was addressing the same Deity, by the same privilege
with his master.”6 Those who lacked such stability in their work and
social standing often found themselves shifting markets to get a job
wherever they could. The rivalry between different trades contributed to the lack of solidarity between slaves in urban occupations.
Urban slaves that worked in outdoor markets often had relatively more social and economic freedom than their domestic counterparts. Urban slave peddlers were often able to keep some of their
earnings, and thus distinguish themselves from slaves with more
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formidable tasks. Henry Koster, a British resident of Portugal who
journeyed to Brazil, observed that enslaved urban women could be
seen “selling oranges, other kinds of fruits and cakes, and canoemen with their long poles, unable to delay, bargaining with them
for some of their commodities.”7 While the limited freedom of action in an outdoor market like the one Koster described empowered
many urban slaves, this environment fostered conflict. In addition,
the government, fearful of a black majority, “found it advantageous
to encourage hostility between Africans and creoles, blacks and mulattoes, freed men and slaves, in order to prevent them from forming a common front against the ruling establishment.”8 Even though
the government tried to prevent it, slaves that engaged in the same
trade often formed close bonds with the free blacks and mulattos
they worked with, especially when they were of the same ethnic
background. These partnerships can be attributed to the dynastic urban setting that allowed for the growth of informal economies. Such
relationships were positive for the solidarity of the entire slave community, serving as the basis for the foundation of religious confraternities, which played a major role in developing communities for
slaves in urban Brazil.9
As societies of mutual aid and brotherhood, these religious
confraternities provided a framework for limited cooperation and
solidarity between slaves. The Church was an integral part of an
African slave’s life from the time he arrived to Brazil to the day
he died, and it greatly influenced creole slaves from their birth. A
new slave was completely cut off from their past familial relationships, and they often looked to the Church to find community. Slaves
who became members of confraternities believed that they had important rights and responsibilities, and even developed executive
boards with a “king” and “queen” that mimicked the Portuguese
royal court.11 Influenced by the traditional West African definition of
“brother,” which meant sharing origins in the same ethnic group, and
pressure from their masters to find training within the Church to become skilled workers, slaves formed confraternities with increased
frequency. Many Portuguese elites felt that this type of solidarity
through the Church was dangerous to their high status. In his travels,
Koster recalled that “the number of churches, chapels, and niches in
the street for saints [of lay brotherhoods], is quite preposterous.”11
Confraternities provided a popular platform for urban slaves and
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freed blacks to establish community and develop a semblance of
solidarity, although outside of these circles they divided the loyalty
and allegiance of urban slaves to each other.
As confraternities flourished, the rivalry between them
sharply contrasted the brotherhood within them. In 1639, two brotherhoods united to form the Black Men’s Brotherhood of Our Lady
of the Rosarió and São Benedito, solidifying its superiority over
other confraternities. This large organization provided money for
Christian funerals, owned churches, and established a new means of
manumission. Although there was positive solidarity between members of the same confraternity, relationships between confraternities
themselves were strained. Koster noted discrimination between confraternities, and that there were clear “shades” of slaves in different brotherhoods. In addition, he observed that some confraternities
were exclusive with the “shades” of their members.12 Some groups
displayed their superiority over other slaves during religious parades
by relegating recently arrived slaves to the back of the processions.
The discrimination against new slaves demonstrates how established
slaves rarely sympathized with those outside of their social circles.
The Brothers of the Rosarió, along this vein, wrote a letter to King
Joseph I, stating that “it would serve your majesty well to annex [the
lesser black brotherhoods], and in demolishing them and their gruesome cemeteries Your Majesty would be providing a great service
to God.”13 This hostility demonstrates how urban slaves struggled to
differentiate themselves through the European ideals of social class
during this time period. Although loyalty within confraternities was
a lifelong bond, the scarcity of cooperation between them illustrates
a broader lack of solidarity in the enslaved urban community as a
whole.
The solidarity of urban slaves in Brazil depended upon occupation, class, ethnic origin, and gender. Where differences existed,
a sharp increase in hostility and exclusivity arose, and where similarities occurred, deep and familial bonds between slaves developed.
Scholars have put an emphasis on solidarity between slaves simply
because of their status as slaves, but the urban setting of Brazil points
to an entirely different trend. The stratification of slave society can
be attributed to movements in the lower and middling classes of both
Portuguese and Spanish America to distinguish themselves and attempt to rise up the social ladder however they could. Established
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slaves considered newly arrived slaves to be in the lowest ranks because they lacked knowledge of European thought.14 Freed black
slaves often purchased their own slaves so that they could elevate
themselves by acting similarly to their former white masters.15 Within their strategies to establish community as well as their own autonomy, the urban slaves of Brazil perpetuated competition amongst
themselves. Scholars have often simplified the experiences of slaves
in colonial Latin America by brushing over their uniqueness, however, their true complexity mirrored the diversity of the era. Despite
the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888, the Afro-Brazilian community maintained many of their previously held notions of ethnic and
occupational divisions. These continue to affect perceptions of social
status within populations of both African and European descent in
modern urban Brazil.16 Although the struggles of an enslaved life
would seem to inspire unity, in Brazil, it created irreconcilable disunity.
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Coverage of the International Longshoremen’s
Association in Hampton Roads
Corey Wash, Norfolk State University
It was roughly 12:00 pm on October 6, 1923 when unionized longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News, Virginia, walked
out on their jobs after failed negotiations of a new wage scale. The
longshoremen’s contract was about to expire, and the shipping companies made an offer of 75 cents regular pay and $1.07 for overtime.
Although the new wage was an increase in 10 cents, the offer was
not acceptable to the officials of the International Longshoremen Association (ILA), who were seeking 80 cents regular pay and $1.20
for overtime, which was the wage that other workers in the NorthAtlantic ports earned. During the strike, the shipping lines brought
in strike breakers—who worked for the old wage of 65 cents an
hour—and took out the possibility of organized labor in their deal.
The three-week-long strike ended in what could be seen as a victory
for both sides. They did not receive the 80 cents an hour that they
had hoped for, but the ILA was allowed to continue representing the
longshoremen in negotiations for better wages and working conditions.1 What made the affiliation of Norfolk’s longshoremen with
the ILA unique, at the time, was that they were predominantly black
workers in a mixed-race organization.
Earl Lewis explained in his book, In Their Own Interests,
how blacks came to dominate the longshoremen trade in Norfolk by
the 1920s, how they used their strength in numbers to create two successful unions, and how the success of those two unions gained them
recognition from the ILA.2 This paper will take a closer look at the
International Longshoremen’s Association by comparing the Virginian Pilot’s coverage to the Norfolk Journal and Guide, which was
one of the most prominent African-American papers in the South
East. This closer look is necessary in order to understand how the
ILA became one of the most dominant longshoreman’s unions during this time.
Industrialization and a world war created a high demand for
labor in the early 20th century, which caused a mass migration from
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014

39

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

40

James Blair Historical Review

Spring 2014

rural to urban areas. Nearly 1.5 million African Americans took part
in the rural to urban movement known as the great migration and
many ended up in Norfolk, a city that was emerging as a major shipping center. Between 1910 and 1920, the black population in Norfolk
nearly doubled from 25,000 to 43,000 people.3 The demand for labor
during World War I accounted for much of the population increase,
but as blacks were finding new jobs, the same discrimination they
faced in everyday life was also found in the workplace. Whites were
earning more than black workers who did the same work, few blacks
were able to hold high positions, and most blacks were only allowed
to work unskilled-labor jobs. In Virginia, the segregation of the work
force meant that African Americans held dominant roles in certain
fields. In Norfolk, they made up about 90 percent of the longshoremen’s trade, and they used their strength in numbers to fight for better wages and working conditions.4
As World War I brought new opportunities for employment,
the rhetoric that was used to bring the country together gave blacks
an opportunity to seek advancements in the workplace. The two
major black organizations that emerged in Norfolk were the Coal
Trimmers Union Local 15227 and the Transportation Workers Association (TWA). Together they organized workers in trades dominated by African Americans, including: longshoremen, oyster shuckers, tobacco stemmers, and domestic workers. However, other than
the longshoremen, the organized workers had little success. Cigar
stemmers were able to gain higher wages, but their horrible working
conditions remained the same. Hardly any gains were made by the
oyster shuckers or domestic workers after city officials used police
to end their strikes.5
Because of the limited success of the organization of other
black-dominated trades, and economic problems brought on by the
post-war recession, the longshoremen of Norfolk realized they had
a better opportunity to advance in the workplace by shifting their
focus away from organizing local black workers and, instead, affiliating with a national union. In 1921 the Coal Trimmers Union
and the TWA joined the ILA. The merger was unique; the ILA was
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, which rarely allowed blacks to participate in the union.6 The negative effect of the
merger was that the longshoremen were no longer organized in a
way that would help the black community as a whole, and in some
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cases hurt the cause of other black workers. For instance, when black
longshoremen not affiliated with the ILA went on strike, the union
used its dominance to ensure that the strike was unsuccessful. But,
the acceptance of Hampton Road’s longshoremen into the ILA was
important in the fight for racial equality because it meant that black
workers would have a prominent role in an interracial union, and an
opportunity for black leaders like George Milner, who was elected
Third Vice President of the ILA, to achieve high ranking positions.
But the merger meant the longshoremen would have to focus their
attention nationally, and that brought on its own challenges.7
In A People’s History of the United States, Howard Zinn
changed the narrative of the United State’s history, and gave a voice
to groups that were overlooked in most textbooks. Workers in the
early 20th century formed one of the groups Zinn focused on in his
textbook. He explained towards the end of the 19th, and in the beginning of the 20th century, labor unions were rising up all over the
United States. Workers were fighting for better wages and conditions, and many of the strikes led to violent clashes between workers
and police forces. Zinn’s theory was that government officials and
industrial leaders learned that they could eliminate the threat of radical labor groups if they allowed the existence of conservative labor
unions, and made small concessions to workers.8 In the early 1900s,
government officials and business leaders feared radical, socialist labor unions would disrupt the economy and bring major changes to
the country.9 The government limited free speech and threw radicals
in jail in an attempt to deal with the problem, but that only added
fuel to the fire and gave workers even more reason to rebel. Industrial leaders took a different approach and allowed for small wage
increases and better working conditions, and by the end of the First
World War, it appeared that socialism was no longer a threat to the
country. Later, in the 1930s, communism took on the role that socialism played in the early 1900s, and again leaders granted small
concessions to workers in order to encourage conservative labor
unions to keep business uninterrupted. After the First World War, and
through most the 1920s, the threat of radical labor unions seemed
to be eliminated. Although strikes still took place, industrial leaders
were less inclined to make concessions to workers.
It is in this setting that the strike of 1923 occurred, when the
longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area, represented by the ILA,
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struck for better wages. That would be their only strike in the years of
1920-1935, but throughout those years, the longshoremen would see
their wages increase to the point where in 1934 they earned double
what other longshoremen in the area earned. This paper will take a
look at how the ILA was covered by the Virginian Pilot and the Norfolk Journal and Guide during the years of 1920-1935, and show that
while the Journal and Guide’s coverage remained favorable, the Virginian Pilot’s coverage of the ILA in the Hampton Roads area gradually went from negative, to neutral, to favorable, when the union
proved to be conservative and good for business.
Three key events took place between 1920 and 1935 that
will be used to compare the two papers, and show how the Virginian
Pilot’s view of the ILA changed during that time. In the midst of the
first event, the strike of 1923, the Virginian Pilot presented the ILA
in a negative light. In 1931, during wage negotiations, when the ILA
had proved that it operated in a conservative manner, the Virginian
Pilot was neutral in its reports. Then in 1934, the MWIU, a radical
union with ties to communism, emerged in the Hampton Roads area.
When longshoremen of the MWIU demanded higher wages, the ILA
used the strength of its union to put an end to their strike. In doing
so, the ILA showed that their union was beneficial to the shipping
industry, and this showed in the Virginian Pilot when the paper began to write favorably of it. Throughout these events, the Journal
and Guide’s coverage of the ILA remained favorable, even when the
MWIU emerged in Hampton Roads. Even though the MWIU represented black longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News, it was
alleged in the Pilot and Journal and Guide that they were associated
with the Communist Party. P.B. Young, who was the owner and editor of the Norfolk Journal and Guide, expressed that African Americans should not use the Communist Party, but rather, find “safer and
saner” ways to achieve advancements.10
1923: Members of the ILA in Hampton Roads Go on Strike
It was roughly 12:00 pm on October 6, 1923, when unionized
longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News walked out on their
jobs after failed negotiations of a new wage scale. The longshoremen
were offered 75 cents an hour for straight time and $1.07 for over
time, holidays, and weekend pay. The new offer was 10 cents more
than the longshoremen’s previous contract, but the workers were not
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satisfied. Since the acceptance of Hampton Roads’ longshoremen
into the ILA, they had always been paid five cents an hour less than
the workers of the North-Atlantic ports they were associated with,
and when the five cent differential was not abolished in the new wage
agreements, the 2,500 longshoremen of Norfolk and Newport News
walked off their jobs and went on strike.11 The Norfolk Journal and
Guide and the Virginian Pilot took opposing sides when covering the
strike. The Journal and Guide’s support of the longshoremen was
more visible compared to support the Virginian Pilot showed for the
shipping lines. The segregation of the Hampton Roads work force
meant that the longshoremen in the area were mostly African American, and their affiliation with the ILA meant that they were black
workers associated in a primarily white union. Although race was
never mentioned by the Norfolk Journal and Guide, it would have
been important for the writers at an African-American paper to prove
that an all-black union could succeed, and to ensure that the AfricanAmerican longshoremen received the same wage as the white longshoremen working in other ports. Likewise, the Virginian Pilot was
pro-business, which explains why the paper’s coverage favored the
shipping lines. Also, it was catered to a white audience, which meant
that supporting an all-black union that wanted to be paid the same
as whites would have been bad for business. Although the Virginian
Pilot’s bias was slightly more subtle than the Norfolk Journal and
Guide’s, the headlines and articles of both papers left little to the
imagination as to where each paper’s support lied.12
The papers did report both sides of the dispute; however,
each paper’s articles were heavily slanted to favor one side over the
other. One way that they did this was to present information and
then to follow it up by quoting an official, either representing the
shipping lines or the union. When the Journal and Guide reported
on rumors of strikers giving in and going back to work, they gave
the union’s Third Vice President, George Milner, the last word when
they quoted him as saying, “we are standing just as we walked out…
every man is loyal to the principles of organized labor.”13 The Pilot
used the same tactic. When the paper reported that the shipping lines
denied the Union Official’s request for a meeting, the Pilot ended
the article with a three-paragraph quote from the shipping lines as to
why the meeting was denied. In some cases, this made their support
of one side subtler, but by leaving out important information, it likely
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caused readers to have different views as to who was right in the
argument. For example, whenever the Pilot explained why the longshoremen went on strike, it was said that they were rejecting a 10cent increase in their hourly wage, or that they “demanded 80 cents
an hour.”14 While the statements were true, they were worded in a
way that demonized the longshoremen and did not present the whole
side of the argument. Not realizing that the longshoremen were striking for equal pay, readers of the Virginian Pilot likely thought that
the strikers were unreasonable for not accepting the 10-cent wage
increase. Subscribers to the Journal and Guide were encouraged to
view the longshoremen differently. Readers likely thought the longshoremen were justified in their demands when they read: “There
has been some dissatisfaction among members of the International
Longshoremen’s Union of the port of Hampton Roads for some time
on account of the preferential enjoyed by longshoremen of the ports
of New York and Boston engaged in similar work and affiliated with
the same organization.”15 In case there was any doubt that the wage
gap was unjustified, the Norfolk Journal and Guide went further and
explained that the difference in cost of living of cities like New York
and Boston did not warrant the wage differential.16 This assertion by
Young’s paper was probably more hopeful than thoughtful, because,
even then, living costs were higher in North Eastern cities than in
Southern ports.
The articles not only had an effect on the opinions of outsiders reading about the strike, but the morale of the strikers themselves
likely depended upon which paper that they read. On the first day of
the Virginian Pilot’s coverage of the strike, their headline read, “Superabundance of Unemployed Workers Counteracts Effects of Strike
here, Shipping Conditions Practically Normal.” The paper went on
to say that, not only had the shipping lines found enough workers
to load and unload the ships, they were doing it for the old wage of
65 cents an hour.17 In its later articles, the Pilot went further when it
said that they had so many workers who wanted to work for the old
wage that they had to turn many away.18 Any striker that read this
probably felt that their cause was hopeless. But if their morale was
weakened when they read the Pilot’s articles, then their spirits might
have been lifted when they read what was written in the Norfolk
Journal and Guide. The Journal and Guide’s headlines contradicted
the Pilot’s by saying “2,000 men hold out for demands, Ship sailings
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1

44

et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5

Wash

Longshoremen’s Association

45

delayed.”19 Nowhere in the paper’s coverage did it mention that nonunion workers were working for the old wage.
Given that the two papers were divided by race, and that the
longshoremen were African-American, it is surprising that race did
not play a large role in the coverage of either paper. Maybe it was
understood at the time and did not need to be said, but when the
Journal and Guide mentioned that the longshoremen went on strike
because they wanted to be paid the same as the workers in the other
ports, they did not mention that the workers in the other ports were
primarily white, and the pay inequality could have been based on
race. The paper’s status as a southern black publication meant it had
to be calculated in the way it covered racial issues.20 The one instance
when race was mentioned happened in the Virginian Pilot on the
fourth day, when the strike turned violent.
It was approximately 5:00 pm on October 10, 1923, when
shots were fired on the corner of Hampton Boulevard and Titustown.
Although non-union workers were called in to break the strike, the
ILA urged the longshoremen to keep the strike peaceful, but on the
fourth day of the strike a group of strikebreakers were shot at as they
were heading home from a day of unloading ships at the army base.
The event left one man dead and another injured.21
When comparing the coverage of the shooting, two key differences stood out. The Virginian Pilot’s coverage emphasized race
wherever possible, while race was hardly mentioned in the Norfolk
Journal and Guide. There was also a difference in writing style. The
Virginian Pilot’s story was over-sensationalized, especially when
compared to the version printed in the Journal and Guide.
The racism of the early 20th century is evident in the Virginian Pilot’s coverage of the shooting. The author let the reader
know, in almost every instance, when an individual that was mentioned was black. If a white person was being described, Captain
J.A. Rawls for example, their name was all that was used to describe
them, but William H. Ashley is described as William H. Ashley, colored. The race of an individual did not appear once in the Norfolk
Journal and Guide, but it appeared twelve times in the Virginian
Pilot’s article.22 But the fact that race was used so heavily in the Pilot’s article is not as important as how it was used. While the Journal
and Guide described the shooters as “the occupants who opened fire
on the truck,” the Virginian Pilot called them “the negroes who fired
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upon the truck,” and then shortens it to just “the Negroes.”23 It is just
speculation to say why the Pilot chose to cover the story the manner
in which they did. Nevertheless, the paper was known for being probusiness, and emphasizing that the shooters were black could have
been a tactic to deter the public’s support of the strikers. The fact that
the paper exaggerated the number of “negroes” doing the shooting
supports this theory.
The writing styles of the two papers could not be more different in their coverage of the shooting. The Virginian Pilot’s article
on the shooting was over-sensationalized, and in some cases exaggerated, while the Journal and Guide’s version of the shooting was
a bland but seemingly accurate story. The reason behind this was the
Journal and Guide wanted to expand its readership and, at the same
time, work towards racial equality. Since it was a black publication
in the south, the paper had to walk a fine line in order to appeal to
a broader base.24 As a result, the Journal and Guide’s report of the
shooting was short and to the point. It stated that a car with about
“four or five occupants” opened fire on a truckload of strikebreakers
on the corner of Hampton Boulevard and Titustown, one person died
and another was injured, and that the police raided the ILA headquarters shortly after but no arrests were made. In an attempt to sell
more papers, the Virginian Pilot’s version exaggerated the amount of
shooters, saying “ten or more negroes” opened fire on the truck that
was carrying strike breakers. The paper also reported misleading and
irrelevant information, such as the initial reports were that three police officers had been killed when in fact no police officers were shot.
The paper went on to describe how three detectives commandeered a
vehicle and eventually chased after four suspects but no arrests were
made—which was also information that was not found in the Journal
and Guide’s report.25
Two weeks into the strike, it looked like neither side would
be able to come to an agreement. The shipping lines took their offer
of 75 cents an hour off the table, and went further when they stated
that a deal would not be made unless the ILA no longer represented
the longshoremen. In the end, the Federal Government was called in,
and the United States Shipping Board negotiated what was claimed
to be a victory by both sides. The Longshoremen’s wage of 80 cents
was rejected, the 75-cent an hour rate was set in place, and the ILA
was granted the right to be the official bargaining agent of the longhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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shoremen.26
Both the Virginian Pilot and the Norfolk Journal and Guide
had reasons for printing the story of the strike and the shooting in
the way that they did. The Virginian Pilot wanted to sell papers, so
they used yellow journalism tactics to sensationalize the story.27 The
paper was pro-business, which meant that there was a motive to discourage the strikers. The paper wrote that not only were unorganized
laborers working for the old wage of 65 cents, but so many people
were willing to work for that wage that workers were turned away.
The paper also used race to make the people involved in the strike
seem different and unworthy of the public’s support. On the other
hand, because of the class and race of the striking longshoremen, it
was in the Norfolk Journal and Guide’s interest to support the longshoremen. They did so by reporting that the strikers were determined
to continue the fight, were not responsible for the shooting, and that
the ships were not being loaded on schedule. The paper’s location in
the South meant that, since it was a black publication, then it was not
in its best interest to use sensationalizing tactics, or place an emphasis on race in its writings.
It was not until 1927 that the longshoremen of Norfolk and
Newport News would receive the 80 cents an hour that they struck
for in 1923, but just like the circumstances of the 1923 strike, the
local longshoremen’s pay was five cents less than the other North Atlantic ports.28 The Journal and Guide reported on the wage increase
but did not mention that the five-cent differential still remained. It appeared that the ILA had the longshoremen under control. There was
no fuss from the longshoremen, and the Journal and Guide wrote
that “harmonious relations exist between the ILA and employers.”29
The Virginian Pilot did not report on the wage increase. For the next
four years, their wages remained the same, and the ILA continued
their policy of cooperation.
Things changed in 1929; the Great Depression began and
had a decade-long impact on the economy of the United States. The
“Roaring Twenties” came to an end when the stock market crashed
on October 29th, 1929. Large numbers of banks and businesses
closed. Industrial production fell by 50 percent, and many employees
were laid off.30 For example, the Ford Motor Company had 128,000
workers, and by 1931 they had laid off 91,000 people, leaving them
with a total of 37,000 workers.31 All over the country, workers wages
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were drastically slashed, and most considered themselves lucky to be
employed and did not protest. The Encyclopedia of Virginia stated
that the effects of the Depression were not felt as hard in Virginia, although the state wasn’t “depression proof.” Virginia produced many
goods that the nation’s poor could afford, like cigarettes, food, and
clothing, which meant that the state was able to bounce back from
depression sooner than other states.32
1931: Strike Averted
In 1931, near the end of September, it was time for the shipping lines and the longshoremen to negotiate their contracts for the
following year. Industries all over the United States were cutting the
wages of their employees as a result of the economic collapse in the
country. Going into the negotiations, the longshoremen were earning
a wage of 80 cents an hour straight time, $2.60 during meal times,
and $1.30 for overtime—which went into effect after 44 hours, and
included the weekends and holidays. Union officials were in charge
of how many workers were assigned to load and unload each ship.
The new contract that the shipping lines proposed sought to cut the
workers wages to 65 cents straight time and $1.00 for overtime, increase the work week from 44 to 48 hours, eliminate overtime pay for
weekends, and eliminate double-time pay for working during meal
times. The differences in their demands were drastic, and the longshoremen declared if their terms were not met, they would strike.33
Just as they did in the strike of 1923, the Norfolk Journal and
Guide advocated for the longshoremen. They did present both sides
of the dispute; however, union officials were always given the last
word any time that they reported on a claim made by the shipping
lines. In a change to their reporting on the 1923 strike, the Virginian
Pilot, for the most part, left their opinion out of their coverage of the
negotiation process. They did once give the final say to the shipping
lines over one claim made by Union Officials, but that was the only
instance (to be discussed below) where it appeared that the paper
favored one side over the other.
In the paper’s initial report, the Journal and Guide wrote
that the shipping lines sought to cut the wages of the longshoremen,
and if that were to happen, the longshoremen would strike. Unlike
the strike of 1923, the Journal and Guide presented their readers
with a lengthy quote from an official of the shipping lines, which alhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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lowed them to give reasoning for their stance, and why they thought
the cut in wages was fair. Mr. Toppin, representing one of the major
shipping lines stated that the longshoremen were earning 30 cents an
hour in 1912, before the First World War, when “general world conditions might have been considered normal.” By 1931 their wages
had increased to 85 cents an hour (he was referring to wage workers
earned in the North-Atlantic ports; Hampton Road’s longshoremen
still suffered from the five cent wage differential, which meant that
they were earning 80 cents an hour), which was nearly a 200 percent
increase. Mr. Toppin stated that the cost of living since 1912 had
risen by 60 percent, which meant that the longshoremen should have
been earning no more than 60 cents an hour.34 His math was a little
off; a 60 percent increase from 30 cents would equal 48 cents, but
his point remained the same. His view was, given the fact that the
longshoremen’s wages had increased so much since 1912, a 15-cent
cut in their rates was not as drastic as it sounded, especially given the
circumstances of the economy. The Journal and Guide gave the last
word to the ILA when they allowed the union’s President, Joseph P.
Ryan to respond to the claim made by Mr. Toppin. Joseph Ryan’s
response was that the wage longshoremen earned in 1912 was not
a decent wage, and “conditions were such at that time that the men
had no alternative but to accept that scale.”35 Giving the last word to
a union official indicated which side the Journal and Guide favored
in the dispute, but the paper made its stance on the issue clearer the
following week, when it went into greater detail as to why the longshoremen should not receive a cut to their wages.
After the first meeting between the Union Officials and representatives of the shipping lines, it looked as if there would be no
way to avoid a strike. The Journal and Guide’s second article made
a reasonable argument in favor of the longshoremen.
The publishers of the paper probably understood that the massive unemployment caused by the depression might have made readers unsympathetic to the longshoremen’s demands, which explains
why the author was diplomatic in his defense for the longshoremen.
The article mentioned that when other industries attempted maintain
the rates they paid to employees, the result was a massive layoff,
which made the unemployment problem worse. The author went further by explaining that those industries then decided to cut worker’s
wages so that more men would be able to work, and in every case
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014

49

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

50

James Blair Historical Review

Spring 2014

those workers did not threaten to strike. But according to the Journal and Guide, the longshoremen’s dilemma was different. It was
stated that, although the wage they were earning was high, few of the
longshoremen worked a full week, and their average weekly salary
was $15.36 Given the rate the workers were earning, $15 dollars a
week meant that the average worker was working roughly 17 hours
a week. So although their wages were higher than workers in other
industries on paper, in reality, the longshoremen were earning much
less than they appeared to earn. The weekly salary was the major
grievance that the longshoreman had in regards to their wages being
cut. The fact that Journal and Guide wrote “there is great merit to the
contentions which have been raised by the longshoremen” showed
that the paper favored the longshoremen over the shipping lines. The
Virginian Pilot, on the other hand, appeared to be neutral throughout
the dispute, except for one instance.
The Pilot’s report of the dispute between the ILA and the
shipping lines was noticeably different than the paper’s coverage of
the 1923 strike. There were no eye-popping headlines that would
have led the reader to favor one side over the other. The sentences
were not phrased in a way that would have made the longshoremen
seem greedy or unreasonable. Instead, the paper stated what each
side offered, and updated the reader, each day, on how the negotiations went. The only time the Pilot appeared to favor the shipping
lines was in its September 26th article, in which the headline read:
“Longshoremen’s Strike Looming Over Wage Cuts.” In the article,
the longshoremen’s main argument of only earning $15 dollars a
week was presented. The last word was given to the shipping lines
when it reported that the ship owners could not understand Ryan’s
claim, when the longshoremen were paid 85 cents an hour, and guaranteed “at least half a days pay if they worked one hour in loading
or unloading ships.” It did point to the paper’s bias when it gave the
shipping lines the final word over the longshoremen’s major argument against wage cuts, but it was the only instance where the shipping lines received favor. The depression caused extreme unemployment, and workers in almost all industries were accepting wage cuts
in order to not be laid off. It would have been easy for the Virginian
Pilot to demonize the longshoremen for threatening to strike at a
time when most people consider themselves lucky for having a job.
So, what changed between 1923 and 1931 that made the Virhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1

50

et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5

Wash

Longshoremen’s Association

51

ginian Pilot’s coverage of the ILA so different when compared to the
strike of the previous decade? The Pilot was a pro-business paper, so
it would be reasonable to suspect that the paper would have favored
heavily on the side of the shipping lines—especially when it would
have been easy to do so. The most likely reason for this was the fact
that the ILA had proved itself to be an anti-radical union. The Journal and Guide gave weight to this claim when it quoted Joseph Ryan
as saying “our men have put their brains and brawn into the steam
ship business, and have successfully fought to keep communist, radicals, the I.W.W. and the like out of the game.”37 Union officials were
often accused of being in collusion with the shipping lines. So, in
a way, the ILA was good for business. Even though the longshoremen’s wages increased nearly every year, the alternative could have
been much worse for the shipping lines. The union maintained the
status quo, which the Pilot pointed out when it wrote that “there has
been no strike of longshoremen for a number of years in Norfolk or
Newport News.”38
1934: The Emergence of a Radical Union
Since the emergence of the ILA in the Hampton Roads area,
the union received favorable coverage from the Norfolk Journal
and Guide. From 1920 to 1930, the Virginian Pilot’s coverage of
the union seemed to have transitioned from hostile to neutral. But in
1934, the emergence of a second, and more radical longshoremen’s
union would turn the Pilot’s coverage of the ILA from neutral to
favorable.
The ILA’s policy of cooperation with the shipping lines allowed for some dockworkers to feel that the union officials were too
cozy with the shipping lines. In 1934 that argument was made by local longshoremen who joined the Marine Workers Industrial Union
(MWIU).39 The leader of the local MWIU was Alexander Wright,
who was a spokesperson for the Communist Party, and although
union representatives denied that it was a communist organization,
both the Pilot and Journal and Guide made multiple allegations of
the MWIU’s ties to communism.
Longshoremen not affiliated with the ILA had reason to protest; their hourly wage was 40 cents an hour, which was half the
rate the ILA longshoremen earned.40 The MWIU made its demands
on April 30th, 1934, which included a wage increase to 60 cents an
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hour. When the time to meet their demands expired, roughly 350
longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area went on strike.41
The Virginian Pilot’s coverage of the MWIU strike was
very similar to its reports of the 1923 ILA strike. It discouraged the
strikers by writing how little the shipping industry was affected and
how many workers showed up to work at the wage that the striking
longshoremen were not satisfied with. The Pilot went further with
an article that denounced the merits of the striking longshoremen.
The article mentioned that the MWIU was “less conservatively led
and advised” than the ILA, and went on to say that their strike was
“ill-timed and ill-advised” and that “common sense took a vacation”
when the officials made their demands.42
Throughout the strike, the Pilot repeatedly reported that the
ILA was not involved, and spoke favorably of the union. In doing
so, the Pilot’s reporting of the ILA went from neutral to positive.
During the ordeal, the ILA proved why they were worthy of the favorable light that the paper was beginning to portray them in. The
Pilot quoted the Third Vice President of the ILA, George Milner in
saying he was willing to “throw every single one of its members into
the breach so that shipping would not be affected by the strike.”43
Milner’s remarks proved just how beneficial the union had become
to the shipping industry. Not only had the union kept its members
in line by not allowing a strike in the area in 11 years, the union
was now using its members to break strikes and prevent any radical
unions from seeing the light of day. As a result, the MWIU’s strike
ended a few days after it began, with none of their demands met. A
few months later, the union was non-existent in the area.44
Later that year, the ILA would be rewarded for the role they
played in breaking up the strike of the MWIU. After negotiations,
longshoremen represented by the ILA received a pay increase of
10 cents an hour. The Journal and Guide again reported that “relations between the laborers and employers are very harmonious.”45
ILA members in Norfolk and Newport News had come a long way
since their strike in 1923. In 1922, the longshoremen were earning
65 cents an hour, and by the end of 1934 their wage had increased
to 90 cents an hour. There was a negative side to the advancements
that they made. Their wages and working conditions had improved,
but those advancements were only shared by members of the ILA.
Other longshoremen in the area were paid half of what the ILA memhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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bers earned. The strength of their union meant that a strike of longshoremen could not be successful without their participation, but as
shown in the MWIU strike, they were not willing to participate and
even volunteered to use their men to break strikes. This showed that
the ILA not only kept its members in line—there had not been an
ILA strike in Hampton Roads since 1923—but by preventing other
strikes from being successful, they kept all longshoremen, including those not represented by their union, in line. This meant that the
union was good for business and explains why the Virginian Pilot,
a pro-business paper, changed its stance on the ILA. In the strike of
1923, when it was unclear what role the ILA would play in this area,
the Pilot covered the union negatively. In 1931, when the ILA acted
conservatively, the paper was neutral in its coverage of the union.
Finally, in 1934 when the ILA showed that they were beneficial to
the shipping industry, the Pilot spoke highly of the union. During
the same time period, the Journal and Guide’s support for the ILA
never wavered. The paper advocated for the union in every dispute
and wage negotiation that took place. The conservative nature of
the ILA was beneficial to the Journal and Guide’s pursuit of racial
equality. The ILA improved the wages and working conditions of
black longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area, and although this
meant that other black workers suffered because of their success,
they were working towards equality in a way that the Journal and
Guide’s owner, P.B. Young considered “safe and sane.”46 In other
words, the ILA had become part of Tidewater’s establishment, both
black and white.
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A Cycle of Revenge:

A Guerilla Warfare and Union Policies in the Border States,
1861-1865
Sabrina Manfield, The College of William & Mary

Pulling out his pistol, Confederate guerrilla Joseph M. Bailey fired at a Federal raider, intent on murdering him. At that same
moment, the man desperately declared his wish to surrender and fell
to the ground. Bailey believed he had killed him; however, the cap
of his pistol was caught inside the round pipe of the gun. The man
suddenly jumped to his feet and began to run. Bailey quickly caught
up to him, seething with fury and prepared to shoot him again. As
he ran, the man collapsed, begging Bailey for mercy. He announced
that his wife was dead, and he had five small children at home who
needed him. After hearing that appeal, Bailey’s desire to kill the man
evaporated, and the Federal raider extended his hand to him. Bailey
recalled, “I took the proffered hand and freely confess that in spite of
my greatest effort, sympathetic tears trickled down my cheeks. Such
is the fickleness of the human heart. One moment ready to commit
atrocities and the next melting with tenderness.”1 Even when writing
his memoir, this moment still resonated lucidly with Bailey.
While Civil War guerrillas were responsible for some of the
most cutthroat killings in American history, Bailey’s story reveals
that they were still capable of showing mercy. Regardless of the
guerrillas’ true motivations, the Union army perceived them to be
uncontrollable and brutal. These negative perceptions influenced the
Union to develop stringent policies against the Confederate guerrillas; as a result, the guerrillas ruthlessly sought retaliation against
the Federals. Ultimately, the vengeful relationship between the two
forces infiltrated and destroyed the lives of innocent civilians.
Historian Stephen Ash articulates, “Clearly, guerrillaism was
a masculine phenomenon representing, at least in part, the defense
of personal honor against the degrading tyranny of Federal rule.”2
Taking Ash’s argument a step further, this paper assesses both the
concept of personal honor and of revenge as they relate to guerrilla
warfare. While guerrillas wanted to protect their own manhood, they
were largely driven by injuries that were inflicted upon their families
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014

57

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1

58

James Blair Historical Review

Spring 2014

and their communities. In addition, Historian Daniel E. Sutherland
argues, “Confederate guerrillas influenced the military policies of
both sides. Rebel irregulars also helped their nation lose the war.”3 In
Sutherland’s book, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War, he provides insightful analysis about
the relationship between guerrillas, Union policy, and Confederate
morale. This paper conducts a detailed examination of Union policies and establishes a causal relationship between the undertakings
of the Union army and the actions of the Confederate guerrillas. This
essay uses letters, newspapers, memoirs, and the established arguments of historians to put forth a comprehensive explanation of the
connection between the actions of the Confederate irregulars and the
policies of the Union army.
The use of irregular warfare during the Civil War began with
an incident in Baltimore, Maryland, on April 19, 1861. The Sixth
Massachusetts regiment had come to take control of the city in order
to protect the border of Washington, D.C., the capital of the United
States. In addition to sending troops to Maryland, Lincoln also attempted to enlist Marylanders into the Union Army. These two factors caused the city of Baltimore’s support for the Union cause to
plummet. As the Sixth Massachusetts regiment marched through the
city, soldiers were shot, pegged with bricks, and hit by stones.4 The
author of an editorial in the Boston Daily Advertiser stated that the
regiment “was attacked by lawless men and boys, with stones, brickbats and firearms…The attack was disgraceful, and was not participated in by any Union man, or upholder of the laws of this country.”5
As this article suggests, the conflict in Baltimore instigated tensions
between the Union army and irregular raiders. The U.S. government
subdued the chaos, but the atmosphere of dissent in Maryland had
been established.
While most Maryland secessionists left the state to join the
Confederate army, a small number remained in order to wreak havoc
on the Unionists. The Confederate sympathizers acted as spies in
Federal camps, concocting plans to kidnap Union officials and raiders. The conflict in Baltimore inspired similar instances of violence
throughout the Border States over the remainder of the Civil War.
Most significantly, after the initial irregular activity in Baltimore, the
infliction of revenge became routine; as a consequence, there were
often instances of “violence against those who retaliated.”6 This
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nasty cycle of revenge defined the relationship between Confederate
guerrillas and the Unionists throughout the Civil War.
Following the incident in Baltimore, widespread support for
guerrilla warfare emerged throughout the Confederacy. Confederate
leaders such as Virginia lawyer and polemicist George Fitzhugh anticipated that the war was about to take a violent turn. In early 1862,
he argued that if the Union infiltrated the interior of the South, the nation’s “chief reliance…must be on irregular troops and partisan warfare.”7 In addition to the endorsements of respected figures such as
Fitzhugh, the civilians of the Confederacy were strongly influenced
by the words of the press. In May of 1862, The Semi-Weekly Raleigh
Register, which was based in Raleigh, North Carolina, released an
article advocating for civilians to join partisan bands. The article emphasized that partisan rangers would be much more beneficial to the
Confederate cause than “a regiment of undisciplined” soldiers.8 The
piece also stated that as partisans, they would not have to “chafe under the restraints and dull monotony of camp life, but lead a life full
of adventure and excitement.”9 The ideas propagated by the press
matched the desires of Confederate citizens, who wanted to contribute to the war cause while remaining in charge of their own actions.
While many Confederate leaders doubted the reliability and
loyalty of partisans, the Confederate army decided to use irregular
warfare because it produced quick results. The Confederate army
used a variety of tactics in order to control Union invaders, but the
threat of guerrilla violence was the most efficient way to deter intruders.10 On April 16, 1862, the Confederacy passed the First Conscription Act, which called all white men from the ages of eighteen to
thirty-five into service. Five days later, on April 21, the Confederate
Congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act (PRA), which officially allowed irregular groups to be formed with the President’s approval.
Inspired by images of mystery, freedom, and adventure, thousands
of Confederate civilians became partisan rangers or joined guerrilla
bands.11
While guerrillas and partisan rangers each participated in
forms of irregular warfare, it is important to examine the differences
between these two types of fighters. In theory, partisan rangers were
supposed to be subjected to all of the same treatment and rules as Confederate soldiers. The Confederate army also compensated them for
their actions, but they were only paid for “subsistence and forage.”12
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Partisans also served as a defensive support system for the Confederacy. This type of fighting “legitimized the sort of free-wheeling
operations” that many Confederates preferred to more structured
kinds of warfare.13 On the other hand, rebel guerrillas were outlaws,
who acted completely independently of the government. As historian
Leo Huff stated, guerrillas were “troops not belonging to a regular
army” who employed tactics such as “raids, extortion, destruction
and massacre…They were peculiarly dangerous.”14 Guerrillas were
known for their unmatched ruthlessness, their elusiveness, and their
cunning.
In spite of their differences, guerrillas and partisans generally had one important motivation in common: they wanted to fight
for their own communities.15 Many men in the Confederate army
were sent away from their families, but independent partisan groups
almost always remained close to their homes. Another common
thread that connected both groups was the desire for retaliation. Partisan rangers and even members of the regular army often breached
the restrictions of standard warfare in order to avenge their family
and friends.16 The most significant difference between partisans and
guerrillas was the latter group’s focus on the infliction of fear. Daniel
Sutherland articulated, “Guerrilla strategy…recognized terrorization
of civilians as a legitimate goal. Unfortunately the best method of
achieving the goal of terror was, likewise, terror.” While the two
groups were similar, the goal to infuse their victims with horror was
unique to the guerrilla culture, and it differentiated them from partisan warriors.
In the summer of 1862, the nature of the Civil War transformed. After General George B. McClellan conducted an unsuccessful attempt to seize Richmond, the Union started to employ new
tactics.17 A major turning point in the relationship between the guerrillas and the Union army occurred on August 13th. A large brick
building, which was located on 1409 Grand Avenue in Kansas City,
Missouri, collapsed. Thomas J. Ewing, the Union Army general
from Kansas, had been using the building as a prison for Southern
women and girls, who had been accused of serving as spies for the
Confederacy. The collapse killed and injured several sisters of guerrilla Bill Anderson, and it was rumored that Ewing had engineered
the collapse.18 Historian Richard S. Brown argued that the collapse
contributed to rise of guerrilla activity during the war. He claimed
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that the tragedy “tore the last thin covering of mercy from the hearts
of Quantrill’s boys.”19 Though the incident was likely an unfortunate
accident, it fueled guerrillas with a powerful desire for revenge.
The summer of 1862 was also significant because the Federals began utilizing a strategy of “hard war” and moving away from
their traditionally conciliatory policy.20 Only five days after the collapse of the Kansas City prison, General Thomas Ewing issued Order No. 10, which established the Union’s aggressive policy toward
guerrilla warfare. The order proclaimed, “Officers will arrest and
send to the district provost-marshal for punishment, all men…who
willfully aid and encourage guerrillas, with a written statement…of
the proof against them.”21 Ewing specified that the marshals would
attempt to determine which guerrillas were coerced to act against
the Union and which ones were genuinely disloyal; however, it was
difficult to make these distinctions without knowledge of the guerrillas’ thoughts. This lack of clarity resulted in the tragic execution of
many innocent citizens, who had been accused of guerrilla activity.
Most significantly, the order specifically stated that the “wives and
children of known guerrillas…will be notified by such officers to
move out of this district….”22 Clearly, this provision indicated that
the family members of guerrillas were going to be required to leave
their homes. The combination of the collapse of the prison and Order
No. 10 infused many guerrillas with fury, inspiring them to act more
violently and ruthlessly.
While the Union’s transition away from conciliation inspired
an increase in irregular warfare, in turn, the upsurge in guerrilla activity caused the Union to further harshen their attitudes towards unregulated actions. In the summer of 1862, Union General William T.
Sherman declared, “All the people are now guerrillas.”23 Despite the
fact that not all Confederate civilians were actually guerrillas, the
actions of the Union army often reflected Sherman’s philosophy. The
Federals killed Confederate band member John L. Owen because he
was accused of bushwhacking.24 In the words of Worthington Davis,
a veteran campaigner in Kentucky and Tennessee, “The bushwhacker was not a soldier but a cowardly, contemptible individual, who
never carried out hostilities unless he was unopposed…At night he
could be found lying in ambush to kill some unwary victim simply
for the plunder.”25 While guerrillas made up only a small number of
irregular fighters, partisans and guerrillas were commonly accused
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of bushwhacking. In reality, Owen served in a group of sanctioned
partisan rangers. His wife, Nancy Owen, articulated, “I do know and
can say with truth that he never engaged in what is termed bushwhacking….”26 After six months of spying on him, the Federals invaded Owen’s home. Nancy Owen recounted, “They made him sit
down on a log which lay close to a fence…and there took the life of
an innocent, unresisting man. They left him, there on the public road,
shot down like a wild beast.”27 It was incidents like this that inspired
guerrillas to seek revenge. Owen was a sanctioned partisan ranger,
and in the absence of proof, he was brutally murdered. Clearly, the
Union at times failed to successfully differentiate between partisans
and rebel guerrillas.
As the tragic story of John L. Owen reveals, it was often
difficult to distinguish between partisan rangers, guerrillas, and even
Union soldiers. As a consequence, seeking revenge was a challenge
and sometimes the wrong people were hurt or killed. This confusion
had a significant impact on the civilians. For example, it was impossible to know whether a person’s clothing reflected his true identity.
According to Thomas A. Peters, a citizen of Bolivar, Missouri, “Civilians were terrorized by this uncertainty; caught in the middle of
a chaotic struggle, they could never assume that the stranger at the
gate—whom in peacetime they would have made welcome—was
not their despoiler or even their killer.”28 This uncertainty created a
wave of paranoia throughout the Border States. The Union soldiers
used this panic and ambiguity to their advantage. They would rob the
homes of innocent civilians, but they would not wear their uniforms;
as a result, the people mistook them for bushwhackers, and their actions were not traced back to the Union army. This fluidity between
guerrillas and Union soldiers pervaded the Confederate civilians
with a feeling of perpetual fear.
The subject of appearances led to intense conflicts over the
issue of dealing with imprisoned partisans. During the summer of
1862, commanders of both sides argued vigorously about “the relationship of irregular and semi-regular troops to regular forces, and
the proper treatment of captured partisans.”29 In a letter exchange
between Thomas Hindman, a Congressman and Major General from
Arkansas, and William T. Sherman, Sherman argued that those who
fought without uniforms should not anticipate receiving the same
punishments as soldiers.30 Most Union commanders treated guerrilhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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las and partisans in the same way because neither of them were regular soldiers. Alexander Walker, a prisoner of the Union Army, wrote
in a letter to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, “A number of
our citizens enrolled as partisan rangers or in the State militia have
been closely imprisoned and threatened with death as guerrillas or
pirates.” While rangers acted legally under the orders of the Confederacy, the Union often deliberately ignored the Confederacy’s policy
on partisan warfare. This defiance contributed to the heated conflict
between the Union army and Confederate irregulars.
Towards the end of 1862, the Union began emulating the
methods of Confederate guerrillas. The aforementioned prisoner,
Alexander Walker, wrote in a letter to Jefferson Davis about the villainous nature of General Benjamin Butler. Walker articulated, “The
malice of Butler against females is more bitter and insatiable than
that against males…And this is but a feeble and deficient presentment of the enormities and brutalities of this cowardly and brutal
monster.”31 Especially following 1863, the Union soldiers grew increasingly undisciplined, harming innocent communities.32 Historian
Michael Fellman articulates, “Lawlessness was not true of all regiments, but it was far more characteristic than post-war regimental
histories suggest.”33 Troops in border-towns scoured the countryside
searching for guerrillas, and they believed that “all Missourians were
by nature traitors.”34 While guerrillas presented a dangerous threat
to the civilian populations in the Border States, the actions of Union
troops proved to have equally as malignant effects on border communities.
The confusion that defined guerrilla warfare in 1862 resulted
in the creation of an official Federal policy towards irregular warriors. Henry W. Halleck, who was the U.S. Army General-in-Chief,
created a system to help differentiate among the diverse types of irregulars. The policy, which passed on April 24, 1863, was called War
Department General Order No. 100, and it separated these fighters
into four sections. 35 The “partisan” was awarded the designation of a
soldier; however, insurgents, brigands, and the guerrilla proper were
all deemed to be outlaws, who if caught, could be punished by death;
however, these categories caused more heated contention, since the
definition of partisan warfare was limited to the disturbance of an enemy’s communication system.36 Robbery or pillaging, even if it was
sanctioned by the Confederacy, was punishable by death. The order
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had the opposite of the desired effect. It aimed to decrease tension
and limit irregular activity, but partisan warfare was employed to a
greater extent following the provisions. Historian Daniel E. Sutherland argues that as a result of this policy failure, “retaliation against
local non-combatants and denying captured guerrillas their rights as
prisoners of war became the most widely used means of restricting
partisan operations.”37 As of 1863, the United States had begun to
encourage the brutalization of civilians as a method for seeking revenge against guerrillas.
As the Union policies towards guerrillas harshened, the attitudes of the Union army grew more hostile towards irregular fighters in general. Daniel Robinson Hundley, a resident of Kentucky,
articulated that the Yankee court had “guerrilla-on-the-brain” as a
result of John Morgan’s raids and the activity of other partisans.38
Hundley assessed, “Every man arrested within the limits of the State
of Kentucky, be he soldier or citizen, was considered a guerrilla or
bushwhacker.”39 He specifically recalled the execution of J.J. Nickell, a Confederate soldier, who was an unfortunate “victim of Yankee
tyranny.”40 Massachusetts’ politician and Union General, Benjamin
Franklin Butler, held very strong negative sentiments towards guerrillas. He believed that guerrilla warfare should be punished with
“the last severity,” and that rebels who murdered Union men should
have their property burned.41 He argued that $1000 was the appropriate reward for every “Guerilla head.”42 He justified this statement by
articulating that the Union would bring the rebels “uncivilized system of warfare to a sudden termination” by employing “an equally
uncivilized remedy.”43 Similarly, General William Tecumseh Sherman found guerrilla groups to be equally “injurious” to both the Rebels and the Unionists.44 As the opinions of army officials towards
generals worsened, the merciless punishment of guerrillas became
commonplace.
While the Union generals had always perceived the guerrillas negatively, Northern soldiers and civilians developed intense
feelings of animosity towards guerrillas in the latter years of the
war. Albert O’Connell Marshall, a soldier from New Lenox, Illinois,
stated, “These guerrilla bands are thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by
nature. They terrorize over those they pretend to befriend.”45 Marshall had formed his perception of guerrilla bands based on rumors
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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about guerrilla leader Timothy Reaves. Though Marshall had never
met Reaves, he heard that he was “one of the meanest leaders of an
irregular band” along the border of Missouri and Arkansas. Namecalling was an easy way to dehumanize the guerrillas, making them
easier to kill. Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, who was a Union
commander in North Missouri, recalled an instance where a band of
guerrillas was “yelling like demons.” The Union men then proceeded
to swiftly kill “thirteen of the villains.”46 The tactic of euphemistic
labeling helped the Union army to morally justify their actions.47
On the other hand, there were Union soldiers who saw the
humanity behind the actions of Confederate irregulars. Union soldier
John E. Whipple recognized the compassion that the actions of guerrilla John Hunt Morgan illustrated. While Morgan burned bridges
up in the Tennessee mountains on multiples occasions, he always
informed “the trains on the road after he [had] burned the bridges
which shows he is something of a man after all.”48 Though Morgan
used drastic tactics to fight for the Confederacy, Whipple’s words
elucidate that Morgan did show respect for the lives of innocent civilians. While the North perceived guerrillas to be ruthless killers,
some of them did show mercy.
Because of the increasingly vicious actions that the Union
army took against alleged guerrillas, irregulars considered violence
to be the only way for them to defend their communities.49 Missouri
guerrilla leader Clifton D. Holtzclaw wrote to the post-commander at Keytesville, Missouri, declaring his intentions to avenge any
innocent Southern civilian who was harmed by Union troops. He
emphasized that he did not wish to kill any Union soldiers or burn
their homes, but he was “determined to kill two Union for every
So[uthern] sympathizer” that the Union army killed.50 Many guerrillas, particularly leaders such as William Clarke Quantrill and Bill
Anderson, believed that they were protecting their people, avenging their lost friends and family, and defending the Southern cause.
Historian Michael Fellman observes, “the nasty means they usually
employed were forced upon them, by a barbarian foe. Inside, they
were pure.”51 The guerrillas genuinely moral disengaged from their
actions, redefining murder as an act of justice. In the process, murder
evolved into a necessary deed of retribution. In other words, it was
the moral obligation of Confederate guerrillas to avenge the deaths
of their loved ones.
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In August of 1863, the nature of the war took on a condition
of emotionless violence. On August 21st, Quantrill and 450 of his
men stormed into Lawrence, Kansas, and they committed one of the
largest atrocities of the Civil War. They murdered 150 men and boys
in order to avenge all of the Missouri citizens who had been robbed
or harmed by Kansans during the war. When the Civil War reached
August of 1863, “a cycle of retaliation and counterretaliation had
deadened human sympathies and heightened tolerance for death and
rapine.”52 There had been so much violence that people had grown
numb to cruelty, and the perpetrators on both the Union and the guerrilla sides no longer attempted to justify their actions. Violence had
become an accepted state of normalcy. On August 25th, BrigadierGeneral Ewing issued Order No. 11, which forced all residents of the
Kansas City area to vacate their homes and leave their possessions
behind.53 Essentially, this order left the citizens both homeless and
penniless.
The vengeful relations between the guerrillas and the Union
men continued to escalate during the later months of 1863. Guerrilla
leader Champ Ferguson invaded the home of Union sympathizer
John B. Rodgers while he was out of the house. Ferguson and his
band of guerrillas attacked Rodgers’ wife and his seventeen-year-old
daughter, threatening them with guns and pistols. Then, they proceeded to force the women to take off their clothes, while a group
of twenty to thirty men pillaged the home.54 Meanwhile, Union men
vowed to avenge their families for the physical and emotional pain
that the guerrillas had caused. Some Federals chose to become designated guerrilla hunters as a means of retaliation. Fielding Hurst,
William B. Stoke, and George W. Kirk scoured after guerrillas
throughout Tennessee and other border states. They employed tactics
similar to those used by guerrillas, including stealing and burning
Confederate homes. A woman from western Tennessee declared that
Fielding Hurst had “visited almost every corner in the county, taking stock, plundering houses, burning and every other meanness you
could imagine.”55 As of 1864, the tactics of the Union soldiers and
the techniques of the Confederate guerrillas were nearly replicas of
each other.
As the duel between the Union army and the raiders intensified, guerrillas were portrayed scathingly in the Northern press. While
throughout the war the press had depicted guerrillas negatively, the
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number of cutting articles pertaining to guerrillas escalated in 1864.
The Daily National Intelligencer from Washington, D.C. referred to
guerrillas as “merciless bands of robbers and murderers,” who inflicted pain upon their own countrymen.56 The Liberator, a strongly
liberal and abolitionist paper, stated that the guerrilla Sterling Price
had been “seduced by bad ambition,” and that he had made himself
the head of a “perjured crew” and “a leader among traitors.”57 Frank
Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, which was published in New York
City, featured an article about Champ Ferguson following his execution in 1865. The article referred to Ferguson as a “notorious guerrilla and murderer, whose deeds” had “stained the war record of the
Southwestern States.”58 The representation of guerrillas in the press
illustrates the gradual transition of the Union’s attitude toward guerrillas. As the war reached its conclusion, the Federals believed that
the guerrillas deserved no sympathy.
The relationship between the Union army and the Confederate guerrillas had grown to be mutually merciless. This shift towards
total war caused the Confederate perceptions of guerrilla warfare to
change. In 1864, exiled Confederate governor of Missouri, Thomas
Reynolds, who was once a guerrilla supporter, denied help to both
Quantrill and Sterling Price when they asked for his endorsement.59
He recognized that guerrilla warfare had submerged the Confederacy
under a state of anarchy, and the irregular fighting was endangering
the survival of the Confederacy. During January of 1864, General
Thomas Rosser of Virginia began to criticize publically all types
of irregular warfare for its detrimental impact on both the standard
of military warfare and the morale of Confederate civilians. He referred to the partisan rangers as “a band of thieves,” who participated in “stealing, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief
and crime.”60 The majority of Confederate officers had initially supported the partisan system, but they recognized that it was harming
both the people and the Confederate cause. A civilian from Tennessee declared, “The whole country is so demoralized we cannot tell
what may happen.”61 The Confederacy was clearly losing not just
manpower but hope. The guerrillas were desperately committing
ruthless atrocities, and the drained Southern civilians had come to
expect banditry and brutality.
The repeal of the PRA on February 16, 1864 marked the
Confederate government’s official condemnation of irregular warPublished by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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fare; nevertheless, guerrillas continued to resist. A band of Tennessee
guerrillas killed two Union scouts and gang-raped a woman in early
June.62 However, since Mosby’s Rangers and McNeill’s Rangers remained the only two official partisan groups, their impact on the war
was dwindling. Quantrill was killed on June 6 after a month of battling a bullet wound, and Bloody Bill Anderson was killed in late
October.63 This loss of leadership combined with the Confederacy’s
condemnation of partisan activity diminished the influence of guerrilla warfare in the Border States.
Caught up in a coldblooded battle of retaliation, the guerrillas and the Union soldiers both sacrificed their ideologies for the
sake of violence. The Union’s invasive policies stirred up revolutionary sentiments in the Confederacy, which inspired the guerrillas to
fight relentlessly against the Union. Ultimately, the rise of guerrilla
warfare created an atmosphere of violence and fear in the Confederacy. Irregular activity transformed the war into an anarchic bloodbath, which eventually hurt the Confederate cause. Their brutality
motivated the Union to implement more stringent policies and use
harsher strategies. In addition, the perpetual violence damaged the
morale of the Confederate people and created cracks in the unity
of the Confederacy. Overcome by their thirst for revenge, both the
Union army and the Confederate guerrillas destroyed the lives of
many innocent civilians. Ultimately, both groups were directly responsible for the widespread destruction of the Confederacy and the
emergence of total war in the Border States.
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Historical Alternatives in the First World War:

German Conceptualization, Creation, and Loss of Its Central
Europe
Eric Grube, University of Virginia
Introduction: Friedrich Naumann’s Place in Historiography

In 2008, historian Eric Weitz published in The American Historical Review an argument concerning the organization of different
groups of peoples within European political states. He claimed that
from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Treaty of Versailles in
1919, there had been a marked shift in how political states received
their legitimacy to rule. States had been based around multi-nationalism, where the imperial political entity derived its power from
tradition and ruled over numerous cultures that defined themselves
primarily not based on ethnicity but on other determining factors,
such as religion. By 1919, however, political states were to be based
on nationalized populations, where individual states corresponded to
an ethnically uniform population. He argued that over the nineteenth
century and into the First World War, nationalism became a powerful
political force—whereby a people both identified primarily with its
constructed national identity and viewed its state’s authority as being
based on the population being homogenous. Ethnic minorities were
seen as undermining the legitimacy of a self-determined state and
were thus personifications of issues that needed to be resolved.1
Weitz’s argument commendably sheds light on a belief
central to understanding the twentieth century, but it does so at the
expense of other historical possibilities. He focuses solely on what
came to pass, while only briefly touching on the topic of historical
alternatives. Such an approach begs the question: Were there alternatives to the historical processes described by Weitz that offered
something different but were just not followed through due to contextualized contingencies?
Friedrich Naumann, a Christian-Socialist member of the
German Reichstag during the First World War, argued for just that:
he drafted a proposal of Germany’s plans for organizing Europe after
an assumed victory, a proposal that offered an alternative to self-dePublished by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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termined states based on nationalized populations. Naumann wrote
this proposal, entitled Mitteleuropa (or Central Europe), in 1915, a
year after the war began.2 In this piece, he argued for the unification
of the main Central Powers—the German Empire and the Empire
of Austria-Hungary—after the conclusion of the war. He articulated
the purpose of this action: to realize Central Europe’s potential as
a powerhouse able to compete with Russia, Great Britain, and the
United States.3 Naumann also articulated how he wanted this goal
to be achieved. Namely, he wanted to use as models the previous
German Customs Unions, which established joint economic policies, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. This dual monarchy system had been established with the Ausgleich of 1867 and
was organized such that Austria and Hungary had separate domestic
policies but were united in terms of foreign policy. Thus, Naumann
essentially hoped for a Central European confederation that would
maintain the Hohenzollern Kaiser of Germany and the Habsburg
Emperor of Austria-Hungary as rulers of their own domestic realms.
He also hoped this new entity would have joint commissions to set
external economic and diplomatic policy.4 It was to be the taking of
the German-Austrian-Hungarian Alliance to the next level of cooperation.
What this political plan implied was exactly what made it a
historical alternative to Weitz’s conclusion concerning an obsession
with nationally uniform states: Naumann was proposing a political
entity that would be even more ethnically diverse than the already
multinational Habsburg Empire, the fragmentation of which due to
rising centrifugal national forces had initiated the war in the first
place. This combined political entity was to be a demographic brew
of nationalities—Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians,
Hungarians, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians—and religious
confessions—Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and Jews.
This plan meant to incorporate people with different identities in
a manner reminiscent of the earlier system of states ruling ethnically heterogeneous populations in multinational conglomerations.
Naumann anticipated and reacted to counter-arguments to his plan—
namely, problems concerning this confederation’s ability to maintain its power over such a diverse population—by claiming that he
wanted this confederation in Central Europe to transcend the issue
of nationality. He hoped the creation of his Central Europe, which
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was to be a new nexus of world power, would maximize the potential
of all the included nationalities and thus lead to the disappearance
of conflicts concerning nationalities needing their own states. Naumann unequivocally rejected the idea of national self-determination
on the grounds that in Central Europe, divided self-determined states
could not compete in the world.5 He claimed that “The parliamentary
system which is a product of the democratic age has become unusable because it is handicapped by nationalism, the second result of
democracy,” and thus he hoped to bolster the support for his multinational super-state whose power would create a transcendence of the
question and problem of national differences.6
What Naumann hoped was that the war—which he saw as
an immense test, the culmination of diplomatic competition—would
be the sparking event for creating his confederation; the war would
prove how well Germany and Austria-Hungary worked together
and would also demonstrate the absolute necessity of consolidating
their power in such a pugnacious diplomatic arena. The First World
War was to be, for Naumann, the impetus and justification for creating his Central Europe, and he expressed his sentiments when he
stated, “We all wish to begin anew,” a use of rhetoric reminiscent
of Paine’s desires for a fresh start for civilization in America.7 But,
in the context of the Eastern Front, where Germany would occupy,
administer, and briefly acquire territories of Central Europe, what
the Germans would find was not a melting pot, but rather, a crucible
of war. By 1918, this crucible resulted in a Russian desire for peace,
subsequently leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the
Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia. The German demands at this
peace conference in what is today Belarus gave Germany the opportunity to carryout Naumann’s plan: Germany essentially dictated a
short-lived political layout of eastern Central Europe. However, the
final treaty was by no means a transcription of Naumann’s ideas, but
rather, a document shaped by numerous other historical processes,
as will be discussed. To what extent was Naumann’s plan, which offered an alternative to the self-determination model for which Weitz
argues, manifested in and yet also contradicted by this treaty? Questions such as this yield important conclusions concerning just how
Germany’s plan for eastern Central Europe came to be, and how
it created, albeit briefly, an alternative to the idea of national selfdetermination.
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War in the East: Organization and Policies of Occupation
In order to understand the terms of Brest-Litovsk, the German army’s policies on the Eastern Front must first be examined—
not only as a case study of human rights violations but also to see
how a dissonance began to grow between Naumann’s theoretical
ideas and actual German actions in eastern Central Europe.
Western constructions and perceptions of the East very much
shaped how the First World War played out, as evident by the strategies the German High Command had created for dealing with a two
front war. As the European powers mobilized in 1914, the Germans
put into motion their decisive blow against France. The German
High Command thought Russia was too backward to mobilize itself
promptly but also too vast to be conquered swiftly. Removing France
from the war first would let Germany then focus all of its forces on
Russia and achieve an overall victory on both fronts. However, the
advance of the German war machine in the West was halted because
of the German decision to invade France by violating Belgium’s neutrality, a gamble that brought Great Britain into the conflict against
Germany. The German objective of Paris, upon which the German
High Command had placed all their hope of victory, was out of
reach. The Western Front stalled into the trench stalemate already
studied extensively in historiography. Germany’s fear—a protracted
two-front war—had become a reality.
To make matters worse for the German High Command,
the Russian forces mobilized much faster than had been calculated.
The feared swarms of Russian troops began their advance into eastern Germany while the bulk of the German army was not advancing in the Western Front. However, Germany had two advantages
that led to its victory at Tannenberg in August of 1914: the presence
of Germany’s great (and brutal) military tacticians, Ludendorff and
Hindenburg, on the Eastern Front and grave blunders on the part of
Russia’s military command. The Battle of Tannenberg and, shortly
thereafter, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes effectively ended the
Russian push into Germany and led to the German advance into Russian territory.8
The unexpected success of the German Eastern Front in the
first few months of the war is critical to understanding the story of
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The two giants of the Eastern Front, Luhttps://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
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dendorff and Hindenburg, had achieved tangible successes, which
continued to evade the High Command in the West. These clear-cut
German triumphs in a time of growing frustration in the West unequivocally made these German commanders war heroes at home.
Their basis for support from the German masses was solidified, and
this domestic backing led to a historical process central to the war’s
outcome: these commanders would be able to aggrandize their own
influence in politics over the course of the war without much complaint from the civilian population.9
By 1915, Germany had gained control over what had been
Russian Poland, the Russian Baltic regions of today’s Latvia and
Lithuania, and much of what is today’s Belarus. This advance was
when human rights violations first emerged, ironically, by the Russians. The Russian troops, carrying out a scorched-earth retreat, shot
or forcibly moved eastward many of their own peoples who lived in
rural settings, all because of the fear that these peoples could become
collaborators with the invading Germans. A disproportionate number
of Jews were forced out, as their language, Yiddish, was more linked
to German than the Slavic languages were, and thus they were more
likely to be accused of collaboration.10
In August of 1915, the German advance continued, and, to
Ludendorff’s chagrin, what had been Poland was to be administered
by the German civilian government’s bureaucrats under the name of
the Government General of Warsaw. Ludendorff then became determined not to lose custody of the Baltic regions, and he was in fact
successful in this endeavor. This region received the name Oberbefehlshaber Ost—meaning Supreme Command of the East—or Ober
Ost for short. The city of Kowno became the main site of the German military’s occupation apparatus, and Ober Ost was kept under
military control for the duration of the war. And in terms of human
rights, this region saw the gender-specific violations that unfortunately seem to be the rule rather than the exception in modern warfare. Local men were beaten while women were raped, crimes which
the German High Command failed to address.11
In November of 1915, the German Chancellor, Bethmann
Hollweg, convened separate meetings to discuss Germany’s policies
toward both its allies and its enemies. Naumann was asked to attend
despite being just a regular member of the Reichstag. However, his
role in this process was that of an observer; rather than being molded
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actively by him, the policies were simply reported to him after the
deliberations had taken place.12 The high authorities’ decision to marginalize Naumann in these initial meetings might seem benign, but it
was truly indicative of what was to pan out on the Eastern front. At
this moment in the war, numerous disconnects between Naumann’s
theories, still being finalized into its published form, and German
policies began to emerge.
Naumann argued for two main things: an economic and political union of Central Europe that was mutually beneficial to all of
its inhabitants and a powerful super-confederation that transcended
the divisionary nature of nationalism and national identity.13 Reality, however, was much different. Germany’s three main principles
of occupation in Ober Ost, as will be explained, were “‘Order of
Rule,’” Verkehrspolitik (literally, “transport politics”), and the spread
of German culture, or Kultur, by means of the educational institutions. All three of these policies ran counter to Naumann’s two central tenets. Under Order of Rule, German military needs took priority
over any local or civilian needs, thus contradicting Naumann’s first
tenet. With Verkehrspolitik, or movement policy, the German occupiers committed abuses that led to a process of solidification of the occupied peoples’ national identities, a growing national consciousness
that directly contradicted Naumann’s second tenet. The implementation of German education policy in the schools of Ober Ost further
crystallized the national identities of the occupied peoples, and thus,
the Kultur policies also led to the opposite of Naumann’s second
tenet.14
Order of Rule manifested itself mainly in the German exploitation of the agricultural and other natural resources of Ober
Ost. Nature itself, the physical essence of a nation, was violated on
a mass scale, with horrendous consequences for the local inhabitants. Because the German war machine required large amounts of
foodstuffs, and because the Allied blockade halted the import of food
from around the world, eastern Central Europe’s fields and granaries
were exploited immensely. The local peoples were robbed of their
livestock—especially horses, vital as they were for transporting war
supplies—and locals who refused were sometimes shot on the spot.
Tickets were administered to people whose property had been taken
so they could be reimbursed after the war, but the backing of those
reimbursements depended on a German victory. The total monetary
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value of the goods taken from Ober Ost came to about 338,606,000
marks.15 Clearly and unsurprisingly, the practical and logistical
needs of the war trumped the Reichstag’s rhetoric of maximizing
all nationalities’ potentials, but what is surprising is the extent to
which the German policy worked against itself. The requisition of
livestock and the abuse of locals that drove them into smuggling or
stealing actually significantly crippled the agricultural productivity
of the area. The destructiveness of Germany’s Order of Rule thus
sometimes trumped its own best interest.16
German Verkehrspolitik (“transport politics”) focused on
the movement of peoples. This policy had two main facets. The first
blended with Order of Rule and centered on extracting men from
their local towns and forcing them into labor brigades, which were
then shuffled around Ober Ost to wherever labor for the German
war effort was needed. In total, about 60,000 Lithuanian men were
forced into labor companies, many of whom were grabbed by German soldiers waiting for them to come out of churches. Malnutrition,
overwork, and disease were a deadly triad, and many laborers never
returned home. Although this policy of labor units was officially
done away with in September 1917, the use of forced and exploited
labor continued up until the end of the war.17 The second facet of
Verkehrspolitik was about restricting the movement of the rest of the
civilian populations by means of identification cards. Inhabitants of
Ober Ost ten and older were required, adding insult to injury, to buy
an individualized identity card, complete with fingerprints. A total of
1,800,000 were issued, and they were to be presented anytime a German occupier requested to see them. These cards made it difficult to
travel, as the Germans did not like people leaving the locality printed
on their card.18
Ironically, Order Rule and this shuffling of laborers around,
causing detrimental economic consequences, made it such that the
national identities of the people affected actually became more solidified. The inhabitants of Ober Ost began to relate with other people
who had been similarly abused and realized what they had in common as opposed to the abusive Germans. The locals depended on
each other more and more for help, strengthening the national identities of the occupied regions. Thus, the German war policies in the
East, specifically in Ober Ost, led to a strengthened sense of national
awareness amongst the occupied people, directly counteracting NauPublished by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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mann’s goal of a Central Europe that transcended the question of
nationality.19
The education policies contained within the German plan
for establishing German Kultur in Ober Ost also hardened the resolve of local people to identify with their nationality because of two
important aspects. First, the Germans hoped to eliminate all traces
of Russian influences from the schools. Thus, the Germans allowed
for the instruction of most subjects to be conducted in the local languages of the inhabitants, as opposed to the traditional Russian that
had been used. This helped lead to the standardization of local languages, such as Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish, as more uniform
styles of these languages were used to instruct school children. Thus,
the educational policy linked the identity of the locals with their native languages, further fanning the intensity of nationality in this
region, all against Naumann’s hopes. The second aspect of the German educational policy was that Ober Ost unsurprisingly deemed
the German language a necessary subject. This mandatory teaching
of German grammar and vocabulary, however, led to a spiteful backlash against German culture, as the locals resented the fact that they
had to learn German. Thus, Ober Ost contradicted Naumann’s proposal because it attempted to establish German cultural dominance
and consequently, although inadvertently, increased the tendency of
local inhabitants to identify with their own culture and nationality.20
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Germany Organizes Eastern Central Europe
By 1917, the Russian ability to make war was broken while
the Tsarist regime toppled under the pressure. A revolution in March
introduced a parliamentary government headed by Kerensky, but this
government’s unwillingness to make peace with the Central Powers
reduced its own base of support. The Germans aided Lenin’s return
to Russia in order to spark another revolution that would weaken
Russia further and force a conclusion of the Eastern Front. The
Bolsheviks seized power, and on November 8, 1917, declared their
desire for peace. The delegates of the belligerent powers—notably
Trotsky from Russia and, after the armistice of December 15, Kühlmann from Germany—met in the town of Brest-Litovsk in Germanoccupied Russia.21 The temporary dividing line created by the armistice, according the Third Article of the Armistace document, was
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the front line of the war itself—from the Gulf of Riga to the border
of Austria-Hungary.22
However, a noticeable shift in the German rhetoric had occurred, and that led to serious resentments on the part of the Russians. Initially, the German claims about its war goals had been
strictly, even if only superficially, non-expansionist in the East. This
more modest rhetoric was evident in Naumann’s emphasis on a political realignment of the Central Powers as they were, in such a way
that did not emphasize the German desire to annex lands. Indeed, he
even stated, “It is difficult to believe that Prussia will alter her eastern
frontier very much unless she is compelled to do so.”23 Furthermore,
Naumann claimed that it was not necessary for Russian Poland to
be included in Central Europe as he envisioned it, given that it was
unknowable in 1915 where the line between German and Russian
forces would crystallize.24 Even as late as July 1917, the Reichstag
re-emphasized the non-aggrandizing war aims of Germany in its
“Peace Resolution.”25
However, upon the discussion of a peace treaty in December,
the German terms had shifted to be very annexationist—indicating
the extent to which the duration of the war had drained Germany
and thus pressured the German diplomats for stricter peace terms.
More insidiously, these harsher terms revealed the extent to which
the German High Command had stolen political power from Kaiser
Wilhelm II and extended this political power into the legislature’s
jurisdiction. The intensification of the war effort provided the pretext
and the cover for this transfer of political power to the German High
Command, marked most notably by the decision to make the everpopular Hindenburg and Ludendorff in charge of the entire German
war effort on August 29, 1916. The goals of the German High Command, having gained more and more political power, were of course
centered on annexing territory that it had been administering. This
shift in the German demands also led to protracted negotiations with
the Bolsheviks, including numerous hiatuses, but ultimately the Bolsheviks had no choice but to accept German annexationist desires, as
they were under threat of a renewed German offensive. On March 3,
1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was officially finalized and established peace between the Central Powers and Russia.26
The Third Article of this treaty is critical in two respects.
First, it set in diplomatic writing Russia’s losses. Russia officially
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had to abandon its claims to any land west of the negotiated line,
which was actually significantly deeper into Russian territory than
the armistice line had been.27 Second, the Third Article clearly stated,
“Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their population.”28 However, there was no doubt that these regions were to be incorporated
into a bloated Germany, as the German High Command wanted a
prize that could be useful in any future wars, which it was already
anticipating. The High Command hoped to use the argument of selfdetermination, as articulated in the final treaty, to justify any annexations.29 The High Command claimed that the populations of these
regions were, in fact, German. Thus, the German High Command
hoped to use the ethnic Germans already inhabiting these territories
to claim these lands for Germany in the name of self-determination,
which was to be their rationalization for their ravenously annexationist peace.30
Thus, the German High Command paradoxically adopted
the rhetoric of its enemy, Wilson’s United States, but perverted it to
fit their annexationist desires and cover up what was clearly a case of
conquest. By directly appealing to popular self-determination based
on nations, albeit with a pre-set German result, the German High
Command directly contradicted Naumann’s rejection of nationalized
self-determination and his hope for the transcendence of the question
of nationality. However, the German High Command’s designs were
also reconciled with Naumann’s text. On a broader level, Naumann’s
Central Europe had already created a framework for thinking of
maximizing the power of Central Europe, as evident by his claims
for creating a political entity in Central Europe that could compete
with Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.31 But now, the
German High Command inserted Wilsonian rhetoric in order to take
Naumann’s plan—the creation of a large state in Central Europe—
and manipulate it to fit their expansionist desires. Thus, Naumann’s
proposal was manifested in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a mindset
that set the terms of creating a super-state in Central Europe, but it
was contradicted by the fact that the use of self-determination in
the treaty underscored the importance of nationality and was used to
justify the German domination of other nationalities. In the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, self-determination, the foil to Naumann’s ideas, was
ironically infused into Naumann’s broader objectives.
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In order to justify the German-dominated Central Europe
with the rhetoric of national self-determination, the state structure of
Ober Ost created petitions, which the inhabitants of Ober Ost were
to sign if they wanted to be a part of Germany. Since the vast majority did not want that fate, Ober Ost was left in an awkward position
where its attempt to justify annexation was proving to be an argument against it. Undeterred, the German High Command had the
state agents of Ober Ost force the local inhabitants to sign these documents. The methods ranged from the use of intimidation to making
signatures the price for needed foodstuffs, all for the purpose of creating a falsified argument for national self-determination.32 However
unilateral Germany’s acquisition of Ober Ost had been, the German
occupation regime went through cumbersome travails to acquire a
Wilsonian rationalization for its expansionism. Unfortunately for
Naumann’s hopes, both this rationalization and this German expansionism were in conflict with his original proposal.
Responses to Brest-Litovsk: Naumann, the Signing Powers, Ober
Ost, and the Western Allies
As the terms for Brest-Litovsk were being solidified, Naumann and numerous other politicians expressed their desires—they
prioritized the ultimate goal of a Central Europe above any annexations pushed for by the High Command.33 Later, in August of 1918,
Naumann himself articulated his thoughts on Germany’s diplomatic
exploits. He claimed that, for better or for worse, the Treaty had determined exactly where the eastern border of his desired Central Europe
was to be. He specifically commented on how the question he left
open in his 1915 document concerning Poland had been answered
by military force, as he stated in his 1918 response, “Since the treaty
of Brest-Litovsk it is no longer a question whether Poland shall lie to
the east or west of the border. The die is cast, Poland remains Middle
European.”34 More importantly, Naumann expressed exactly what he
thought needed to happen as a result of the conclusion of peace on
the Eastern Front—namely, the time for creating his Central Europe,
the joining of the Central Powers into an economic and diplomatic
conglomeration, needed to happen immediately.35 The sense of urgency found throughout Naumann’s response indicates the amount
of stress being felt from the Western Front—he seemed to know that
the claims from the East needed to be solidified as the war dragged
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on with the Western Allies.
Further evidence of the gravity of the situation on the Western Front was apparent in the German High Command’s response to
the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk just months after its finalization. On August 27, 1918, two addendum treaties were attached
to the end of the original document. The first was a general modification of certain articles of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, both clarifying old and attaching new agreements.36 Most interesting is the
Third Article of this first addendum, which claimed Germany was
to abandon some of its land taken from Russia in exchange for financial reimbursement from Russia. By extension, this Article also
established the principle that Germany could abandon any territory
it wished in exchange for Russian financial resources.37 Essentially,
Germany was so strapped for cash as the Western Front caved in that
the High Command was willing to sell back to the Russians some of
its acquisitions from the East. Clearly, the situation was critical if the
annexationist German High Command was willing to sacrifice parts
of its prize for currency. And here is where another historical irony
was made apparent. The context of the war was no longer the delivery room for Naumann’s Central Europe, but rather, it had become
the alter upon which his idea was being sacrificed.
The second addendum treaty to Brest-Litovsk was strictly a
financial agreement, which again revealed the desperation of Germany by August of 1918.38 The Ninth Article of the original treaty had
specified no indemnities were to be paid by either signing party.39
Five months later, however, the Germans demanded in the Second
Article of the financial addendum that “Russia shall pay Germany
a sum of 6,000,000,000 marks as compensation for the loss to Germans caused by Russian measures…”40 Clearly, the circumstances of
the war had shifted since the time of the original document: Germany
had such a need to pay for the worsening situation on the Western
Front that it edited the original Treaty with Russia to make up for the
German High Command’s previous miscalculation.
All of this German back-peddling to impose harsher terms
in addition to the already ravenous territorial claims in the original
treaty culminated in another unexpected development with important implications for Naumann’s dream. Ironically, the victory of
the Central Powers in the East (and the attaining of an opportune
moment to realize Naumann’s blueprint) ended up driving a wedge
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between Germany and Austria-Hungary diplomatically. All of the
territorially and financially ravenous terms forced upon the Russians
made Austria-Hungary feel like it was now waging a war it could no
longer afford just to secure Germany’s annexations.41 The drawing
up of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been, in theory, the moment
when the Central Powers could have dictated the organization of
Central Europe in a way that realized Naumann’s vision. However,
the German High Command chose not to, favoring instead a strategy
that brewed mistrust between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus,
the results of Brest-Litovsk led to the exact opposite of what Naumann had originally planned.
Furthermore, the overambitious appetite of the German
High Command on the Eastern Front contributed to the collapse of
its Western Front. The German military’s final drive for Paris, the
1918 Michael Offensive, disintegrated in the face of the Western Allies, now bolstered by the United States. Meanwhile, one million
German troops remained idle in the occupation and administration
of Germany’s newly acquired lands in the East.42 Two important
historical processes explain the German decision to keep so much
manpower fallow in the East. Ludendorff feared Bolshevik propaganda had too heavily influenced the Eastern troops. Therefore, he
concluded it would be too dangerous to move them to Western Front,
where it was feared morale was faltering. Also, the High Command
believed that number of soldiers was needed to maintain order in the
vast new territories for which it was now responsible. Ludendorff did
realize his mistake and decided to double back on his miscalculation.
Over the summer and fall of 1918, he moved around half a million
troops to the West—but the momentum from the start of the spring
offensive had already been lost.43 While the failure on the Western
Front eventually cost Germany its prize in the East, the prize from
the East interestingly took away from Germany any chance of a more
favorable bargaining position in the West.
The Lithuanian political elite in Ober Ost had their own response to the peace making between the Central Powers and Russia.
As the Russian forces collapsed in late 1917, intellectual leaders in
Lithuania met in Vilnius to establish the Taryba, an executive committee to speak on behalf of Lithuania. The Taryba tried to play different factions within the German government off of each other in an
effort to gain legitimacy. It appealed to the more liberal civilian govPublished by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
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ernment of the Reichstag against the increasingly powerful German
High Command that had essentially supplanted the Kaiser. The Taryba found the Catholic Zentrum party to be particularly responsive.
Its leader, Matthias Erzberger, continuously spoke for the legitimacy
of the Taryba as the true voice of the territory of Ober Ost, or rather,
of Lithuania. The Taryba’s boldness grew such that it declared Lithuania to be an independent state on February 16, 1918, just two weeks
before the finalization of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Now, to be
sure, the German High Command’s desire to have Lithuania trumped
any declaration the Taryba made.44 However, this increasing boldness further illuminated just how German policies led to the solidification of the idea of states based on nationality in eastern Central
Europe—the exact antithesis of what Naumann had had in mind.
The responses of the Western Allies to the Treaty of BrestLitovsk further revealed the historical significance of the German
High Command manipulating ideas of self-determination to support
its own annexations. Upon discovering the German perversion of his
own ideals, Wilson realized that Germany truly intended to treat this
war as an annexationist war. The precedent Germany set in the East
confirmed a fear among the Allied powers that the German militarycontrolled government had similar intentions in the West, and thus
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk led to a radicalization of the war aims
of the United States. Wilson was no longer willing to appeal to any
German liberal sentiments to establish a compromising peace based
solely on his Fourteen Points, a peace that would not have included
such a vindictive punishment for Germany and could have included
Germany in the post-war order. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, however, Germany proved to Wilson that it truly was a military state that
needed to be defeated. Wilson now accepted that unilateral peace
terms, which would restructure the political organization of Central
Europe according to the Allies’ desires, had to be forced on Germany.45 Thus, in another historical irony, while Brest-Litovsk had
been Germany’s opportunity to construct its Central Europe, it ended
up being the Allied impetus for dictating the postwar organization of
Central Europe. And this Allied-imposed organization was to embody national self-determination—the intellectual foil to Naumann’s
ideas presented in Central Europe.
Consequently, both the Central Powers and the Allies responded to Brest-Litovsk in ways that conflicted with Naumann’s
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proposal—the treaty drove a diplomatic wedge between Germany
and Austria-Hungary, while it simultaneously gave the Allies cause
to make sure their terms of self-determination for Central European
nationalities were implemented in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.46 If
Naumann expected the war to be the forge used to create his Central
Europe, it ended up being the kiln in which his plans were consumed.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany’s moment to make real the
idea of Central Europe, had become the petrol that turned the Allied
flame into an inferno.
Concluding Reflections
Naumann, writing his proposal when the war had been going well for Germany on the East, had hoped to construct a political
entity based on principles that ran counter to the trend of his times;
he directly opposed the concept of political self-determination for
nationalities. Instead, he hoped to reuse an older concept of multiethnic political entities, such as that used by the crumbling Dual
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the very crumbling of which resulted
from this rising national consciousness that had initiated the war.47
However, the German policies in their occupation of eastern Central
Europe showed the ease with which national consciousness arose
in Ober Ost.48 Also, the German diplomatic policy at Brest-Litovsk
revealed how a perverse fusion of both Naumann’s ideas of a superstate in Central Europe and Wilson’s ideas of self-determination led
to the justification for an annexationist peace. Furthermore, as has
been argued in this paper, the Treaty itself ended up creating reactions from both within and without the two main Central Powers that
made Naumann’s goal of Central Europe even less of a reality.
Historian Fritz Fischer claims, “Friedrich Naumann’s book,
Mitteleuropa, which caused such a sensation at the time, appears
merely as a remarkable, but yet thoroughly unrealistic, flight of fantasy.” Is this to say Naumann’s text is not useful in understanding the
past? On the contrary, even Fischer concedes such a text helps reveal
the mentalité of German policy makers when he claims it elicited tremendous amounts of responses and debates.49 Thus, an investigation
of this source shows the conceptual contingencies discussed during
the First World War and helps construct an understanding of how
people in this historical context thought of their world. Furthermore,
what makes Naumann’s text historiographically significant is that
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it reveals what seems natural to us—the belief that political states
should be based on nationally uniform populations—was originally
just one historical possibility, a single option among many. Thus, this
assumption concerning states and populations was neither a historical inevitability nor the result of some linear historical trajectory.
To be sure, Weitz’s theory that the twentieth century saw a
marked obsession with uniform populations within political states is
based in historical reality, but a broader and more complete historical
understanding can be acquired when intellectual alternatives are also
examined.50 This is exactly what Naumann’s text has to offer—an
idealized conceptualization of political unity that was supposed to
transcend questions of national heterogeneity as all peoples within
the state reached their maximum potentials.51 Furthermore, many aspects of Naumann’s intellectual creation would later manifest themselves in Europe. It just took an even more destructive World War to
provide a sufficient enough impetus for forming, by way of cooperative economic policies, a multinational confederation in Europe.
Thus, Weitz’s theory does create a basic model for thinking
of historical processes from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries.
However, it falls short in terms of studying contingencies—alternatives in history that did not last but still help create an understanding
of the past. It also does not account for the development of postWorld War II confederations composed of numerous European nationalities and marked by shared political and economic institutions.
Naumann’s Central Europe could provide useful insights into these
historical concepts and more recent processes, and consequently, this
text should be the topic of future historical study.
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